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Introduction
First elected to the presidency in 1946, Juan Domingo Perón has remained one of the
most seminal – yet controversial – figures in the history of Latin America. His rise to power
brought about not just a new era in Argentine political history, but also resulted in the emergence
of one of the longest lasting political movements in the world: Peronismo, or Peronism. Since its
inception, it has been the salient driving force within the realm of Argentine politics for the
better part of seven decades; indeed, since 1946, the Peronists have won 10 of the 13 presidential
elections in which they have been allowed to run. This includes the current president of
Argentina, Alberto Ángel Fernández, who was elected in 2019; and for better or for worse,
Fernández’s presidency will be demarcated by the advent of the Coronavirus pandemic, which
became an international crisis mere months after his inauguration.
Much like Peronism’s influence on Argentina, COVID-19 has continued to shape and
define the world since its initial global proliferation. In many ways, its impact has been macabre,
yet strangely poetic. Almost a century after the 1918 influenza outbreak which took the lives of
millions across the world, the ramifications of the Coronavirus pandemic – like the Spanish Flu –
have reverberated across the world, changing the course of international policies in perpetuity.
The global growth of 2020 was projected at –4.9 percent; and while updated forecasts suggest
that global growth in 2021 will be around 5.9%, such projections fail to take into account factors
such as unemployment, inflation, and debt, all of which have gone up across the world since the
beginning of the pandemic (IMF 2022). And while the entire world may have been devastated by
its emergence, some countries have been hit harder than others. Argentina – after two straight
years of economic decline and a GDP growth rate in 2019 (the year before COVID-19) of 2.09% – suffered a decline in GDP of -16.2% in the second quarter of 2020 alone (Macrotrends
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2021; The Economist 2021). Even as its initial response to mitigating COVID had been touted as
being “the best choice among bad alternatives,” COVID’s continued resilience has highlighted
the Peronist government’s inability to act quickly and decisively to react to changing times
(Bremmer 2021).
But how have countries with differing ideologies responded differently to the same
pandemic? Among developed countries, the United States’ response has widely been criticized
as being inept and ineffective; as of February of 2022, the number of deaths caused by COVID
was over 953,000, around 16% of total deaths attributed to the pandemic worldwide (CDC
2020). There is not a singular reason as to why the United States failed to properly respond;
rather, it was a cacophony of miscalculations, underestimations, and ignorance. The social policy
response was lackluster. While the rounds of stimulus checks did help alleviate the financial
burden felt by families across the country, it was too little, too late (Aaron 2020). The monetary
handouts did provide some semblance of relief for cash-strapped families; but in many ways, it
was regressive, as the lump sum disproportionately helped the rich more than the poor (Peter G.
Peterson Foundation 2022). For the rich, the handout resulted in an increase in liquidity. But for
the poor, it provided little support in paying bills, hospital fees, and other such necessities.
On the other end of the spectrum, nations like New Zealand have been lauded as having
the best approach to the pandemic. Not only did their government enact an all-in approach with
regards to testing and vaccinating, they successfully implemented “social welfare and worker
supports [and] economic [stimuli]”; moreover, the nation’s 2020 budget provided additional
funding for “wage subsidies, support for loans… and support for workers” (Dyer 2021). It
becomes clear that New Zealand’s economic response to the pandemic differed vastly from the
policies of both the United States and Argentina for a variety of reasons. First, whereas the U.S.
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response was decentralized and disorganized at a national level, New Zealand’s national
government swiftly imposed restrictions for the entire country and superseded state-level
authorities. Second, there was a concerted nationwide effort to provide financial support for
workers and employees, the same which cannot be said about the United States. And third, while
the majority of Argentina’s COVID related mandates – as well as a plurality of The United
States’ – came in the form of executive orders, this was not the case in New Zealand. While such
disparities in responses can be a resultant of multiple factors, it can reasonably be assumed that
these economic policies are shaped by each respective nation’s ideological orientation and their
coalitions of support.
While Argentina might not be unique in its failures to reverse the harms brought about as
a result of the prolonged pandemic, it certainly ought not rest on its laurels; other nations around
the world have proven that it is entirely possible to address the same concerns much more
effectively. For instance, neighboring Chile was quick to implement – among other policies –
nationwide vaccination programs; as a result, it was able to turn one of the worst outbreaks in the
world into a symbol of success (Noori Farzan 2021). But with inflation at over 50% and
unemployment at historic levels, the question remains, what part has Argentina’s Peronist
coalition played in the gross ineptitude of the nation’s response? Why has it failed where others
have succeeded? In the nearly 75 years since the emergence of Peronism in Argentina, the
country has gone through bouts of nationwide defaults, debt crises, and debilitating economic
turmoil. But is the link between national economic failure and the prevalence of Peronism a
correlation, or a causation? And if it is the latter, how can these failures be conceptualized
through a Peronist lens?
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Research Question
This thesis seeks to understand the impact of Peronism – and the Peronist coalition – on
the policy choices made by the Argentine government in response to the COVID-19 pandemic.
Peronist economic policies were implemented to stimulate the recovery of Argentina during the
COVID-19 pandemic. Often described as a “vague blend of nationalism and laborism,” Peronism
has remained salient in the realm of Argentine politics since the days of Juan Domingo Perón
himself. In this sense, Peronism as a movement is incredibly unique – and inherently
contradictory. It has been both right-wing and left-wing. It has been both nationalist and internationalist. It has been both protectionist and neoliberal. So how can one define the tenets and
objectives of Peronist economic policy, and how can that be interpreted within the context of the
current COVID-19 pandemic? The question this thesis will seek to answer is the following:
“How have Argentina’s Peronist coalitions of support shaped the country’s economic response to
COVID-19 (i.e., tax hikes, cash transfer programs, rent freezes)?” It appears as though every
country has had a different reaction to the onset of the Coronavirus. But in what ways has
Argentina’s response differed as a result of its Peronist past, and how has that change been
manifested through salient economic policy?
In short, I want to explain how the independent variable – in this case the Peronist
influences on the makeup of the coalitions of support – has affected the dependent variable – the
economic policies implemented in response to COVID-19. This thesis will look specifically at
the policies and laws passed between March of 2020 and March of 2021; the rationale behind the
starting date is due to the fact that the COVID-19 pandemic – for all intents and purposes – truly
became a global crisis in March of 2020. It must be noted, however, that the purpose of this
thesis is not to analyze the traditions of Peronism in Argentina; this is due to the fact that a study
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of this nature would largely be tautological, as past policies shape future policies more so than
any other factor. In looking at history and changes of the Peronist coalition of support, however,
it becomes possible to conceptualize the question at hand.

Research Design and Methodology
In order to address the question of how Peronist coalitions have impacted Argentina’s
economic response to COVID, I first seek to define the various characteristics of Peronist
coalitions of support starting from its historical roots in the burgeoning years of Perón’s
presidency and working chronologically throughout its nearly eight decade-long history, ending
with an analysis of the most recent iteration of the Peronist electoral alliance. Next, I conduct an
in-depth study into the various economic policies passed during the Coronavirus pandemic
between March 2020-March 2022 in Argentina. Once I have accumulated enough information
regarding these policies, I compare them to similar policies from neighboring Chile. Finally, I
conclude my thesis with an exploration of alternative hypotheses, various possible externalities,
and exigent circumstances that might have played a role in the differences between the respective
nations’ policy formation, while also discussing potential avenues of research for the future.
To that end, my thesis will consist of five, distinct sections. First will be the review of
current literature, which will provide the contextualization of Peronism, its economic policies,
and its evolution over the course of history. Included within this section will be a comprehensive
overview of Peronist traditions, a breakdown of the various economic, political, and social actors
that make up each of the coalitions, as well as a look into the similarities and differences between
coalitions over time. In elucidating the parameters of Peronism, a relatively clear and concise
definition can be formed. This will then be used as the benchmark for analysis for later chapters,
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as it will allow for easier identification of the Peronist undertones in the new economic policies
developed during the identified time period as it relates to COVID-19.
To facilitate this, I will use primary sources consisting of the Argentine Congressional
repository (https://www.hcdn.gob.ar/ for the Chamber of Deputies and
https://www.senado.gob.ar/ for the Argentine Senate), the official bulletin of the Republic of
Argentina (wherein the executive branch uploads its various mandates and decrees), and
newspaper articles. I will look to two specific newspapers, La Nación and Página/12, for
information pertaining to specifically tax hikes, cash transfer programs, and rent freezes passed
between March of 2020 to March of 2022. The rationale for choosing these specific newspapers
is due to the fact that their political leanings are diametrically opposed. Whereas the new owner
of Página/12 has openly admitted to continuing the Kirchnerist ties of his newspaper (making it
the voice of the left, or at the very least, those in support of Kirchnerism), La Nación has been
the voice of conservatism for well over 100 years (Ziblat 2016; Ares 1985). Having these starkly
opposing viewpoints will allow for some semblance of objectivity when conducting analyses of
the policies at hand.
There are a few different reasons as to why Chile was selected as the comparative study.
First, both Chile and Argentina are relatively wealthy nations located in the Southern Cone;
Argentina’s nominal GDP (in USD) in 2020 was ranked 3rd in Latin America at $382.8 billion,
while Chile ranks 5th at $245.4 billion (Macrotrends 2021). Second, both were former
viceroyalties of the former Spanish Empire, with Argentina being a part of the Viceroyalty of the
Río de la Plata and Chile being a part of the Viceroyalty of Peru. Moreover, both nations have
had similar historical roots. Third, both Argentina and Chile have had a penchant of getting
involved with dictatorial regimes; Argentina has suffered through numerous military coups in the
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second half of the 20th century, while the politics of Chile are most widely recognized for the
regime of General Augusto Pinochet (1973-1990). In addition to this, both countries were hit
hard by the Coronavirus pandemic.
There are, however, important differences that exist between these two countries. While
they both have had their fair share of dictators, wars, successes, and failures, Chile has often
been rated as one of the most democratic states in the entirety of Latin America, with The
Economist giving it a rating of 8.28/10.00 (The Economist 2021). This makes Chile a “full
democracy;” furthermore, it ranks as the 2nd more democratic state in the region and the 17th
most democratic state in the world. By way of comparison, Argentina has a ranking of
6.95/10.00, a global ranking of 48th, and is typified as a “flawed democracy.” Another difference
is the fact that since its democratization, Chile has remained consistent with the types of liberal
economic policies it has implemented; in contrast, the economic policies of Argentina have gone
through crests and troughs with respect to the types of ideologies to which they adhere (i.e.,
neoliberalism of the 1990s with Menem, heterodox policies of the 2000s, and the return to more
conservative ideals with Macri from 2015-2019). By comparing these two nations that are
geographically similar yet politically different, it will become possible to compare and contrast
the policies of Argentina and of Chile and conceptualize the disparities. This comparative study
will allow me to identify the Peronist elements of the specific policies of Argentina by isolating
the differences between the two.
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Chapter 1. Literature Review: The Peronist Contradiction
In order to understand the impact of Peronist coalitions on Argentina’s recovery from the
ongoing Coronavirus pandemic, one must understand and be able to conceptualize the historic
roots of Peronism itself. More specifically, an in-depth understanding of Peronist economics – as
well as its historical composition – is imperative in being able to identify examples of its
continued salience in a modern context.
Peronism first took control of the political landscape of Argentina with the election of
Juan Perón in 1946; since then, the nation has seen multitudes of iterations, variations, and
regimes that have helped to shape the course of the nation throughout the 20th and 21st centuries.
Its history can be divided into 5 different periods: 1946-1955 (Juan Perón’s first two terms),
1973-1976 (Perón’s third term, as well as the subsequent term of his wife Isabel), 1989-1999 (the
period of Menemism), 2000-2003 (the Duhalde period), and finally, the periods between 20032015 as well as 2019-Present (the Kirchner and Fernández administrations).
Peronism during the time of the eponymous president can be seen as both a rejection –
and the amalgamation – of political ideologies of the past. In a speech given on the 20th of
August 1948, Perón claims that his new political ideology is:
humanism in action; Peronism is a new political doctrine, which rejects all the ills of the
politics of previous times… in the economic sphere its aim is that every Argentine should
pull his weight for the Argentines and that economic policy which maintained that this
was a permanent and perfect school of capitalist exploitation should be replaced by a
doctrine of social economy under which the distribution of our wealth, which we force
the earth to yield up to us and which furthermore we are elaborating, may be shared out
fairly among all those who have contributed by their efforts to amass it.” (Perón 1950)
He espoused the three main tenets of his new political brand, the three “pillars” that would
loosely define – and oftentimes paradoxically contrast – its existence for decades: political
sovereignty, economic independence, and social justice (1950). In short, it was a new political
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movement with a powerful demagogue at its helm, with influences from both the ideological left
and the right. It was more than just an ideology; in contrast to the various different political
ideologies found across the world, Peronism can be conceptualized by its fluidity and its ability
to adapt and change. In fact, it appeared as though Perón himself embraced this, declaring in
1951 that “the masses don’t think, the masses feel and they have more or less intuitive and
organized reactions. Who produces those reactions? Their leader” (1950). This is a key factor in
the longevity of the Partido Justicialista, the main Peronist political party founded by Juan
Domingo Perón himself. Because “winning public office is a primary goal of most parties, their
strategies tend to be shaped by the structure of the electorate and party system” (Levitsky 2011,
30). In this sense, parties that are not able to constantly adapt to its surroundings find themselves
in a rapid state of decline. Perón himself sought to implement social programs to empower and
benefit the working class, while supporting the labor unions and industrialists at the same time;
in doing so, Perón had built the foundations of his party coalition.
The first iteration of the Peronist coalition was spearheaded by the triumvirate of labor
unions, industrialists, and the working class; however, this burgeoning sociopolitical alliance
merits further analysis of its own. Peronist Argentina during the eponymous president’s first two
terms was a labor-based economy, meaning the labor force was viewed as an essential
component within the process of production. To that end, the organization of labor unions played
a critical role in shaping the policies of the Perón administrations. Before his ascendence to the
presidency in 1946, Perón served in the military government (established as a result of the coup
d’état in 1943) as the Secretary of Labor; but this military administration did little to aid the
unions, and in fact, adopted a number of “repressive-type labor” policies to weaken said unions.
After 1946, however, the mutual relationship between the Peronists and the unions forced the
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administration to abandon such policies and implement “a battery of political and economic
measures” to strengthen the labor organizations (Gerchunoff 1989, 64). Such policies include
redistributive measures to increase nominal wages of workers within the various trade unions
(although real wages did not increase at a commensurate rate).
The second main sociopolitical sector – that of the domestic industrialists – also benefited
heavily as a result of the Peronist presidency. It is no secret that Perón’s policies were often
influenced by his xenophobic nationalist Italian idol, Benito Mussolini. And from the beginning,
Peronism was seen as being less open to “foreign capital and trade,” as the eponymous leader’s
ideology certainly reflected an aura of nationalism (Di Tella and Dubra 2017, 6). It must be
reiterated, however, that Peronism is not at all synonymous with nationalism; it is more fluid
than what the parameters of a singular ideology has to offer. For instance, while it is generally
accepted that Peronism is left-of-center, studies have indicated that “the biggest proportion of
believers in laziness as a source of poverty take place amongst Peronists and [American]
Republicans” (5). But this xenophobic and nationalistic attitude worked to the advantage of
domestic industrialists, as “the use of protective tariffs allowed [domestic] industries to operate”
more profitably with complete disregard for foreign competition (Gerchunoff 60). Other policies
such as ISI (Import Substitution Industrialization) flourished during this time period as well,
which will be further discussed in later.
The final sector within the first Peronist coalition – then – was comprised of the common
people: the blue-collar workers and the “public employees” (Murillo and Zarazaga 2020, 128). In
this regard, Peronist coalitions are “mass” coalitions, political alliances that are partially
developed around and mobilized by the types of citizens indicated above. Since its inception, the
Peronist coalition has been the coalition of the people; Perón himself not only implemented
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“policies that directly supported labor,” but was also responsible for establishing a variety of
“social programs in different areas… ranging from increased access to free health care, to the
creation of a comprehensive housing program” (Di Tella and Dubra 2017, 7). In fact, Peronist
coalitions’ rapport with the marginalized and poor goes back to its roots; one of the 20 basic
tenets of the ideology states that “no Peronist should feel that he is more than he is, nor less than
he should be. when a Peronist begins to feel that he is more than he is, he begins to change into
an oligarch” (Perón 1950). For the disenfranchised Argentines, Perón was their champion, the
leader whose rhetoric would galvanize them to action.
The same can be said about the principles of Peronist economic policies. Pablo
Gerchunoff posits that one of the focal points of Peronist economic theory during the Perón
presidency was the undertaking of the creation of “an alliance of urban social sectors aimed at
establishing a semi-closed growth strategy” (Gerchunoff 1989, 60). In combining protectionist
measures – such as tariffs, subsidies, and “the nationalization of foreign trade” – with more
capitalistic ones – such as investments made into the agricultural sector – allowed for Perón to
focus on the internal growth and development of his national economy, while ensuring that the
inflow of foreign capital (which his administration totally controlled) would be monitored and
molded to his liking (66). In essence, Peronist economics – much like the tenets of Peronism
itself – is both protectionist and nationalist. Even virulent anti-Peronist government officials
implemented policies pertaining to those of the Perón government. Raúl Prebisch, an Argentine
economist most widely recognized for his development of the theory of Import-Substitution
Industrialization (ISI), became the special economic advisor to the new military regime after the
successful coup against President Perón. ISI was an economic theory that promoted the
protection of growing domestic industries within developing economies so as to decrease the
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nation’s dependence on foreign trade; in doing so, acolytes of ISI theory believed that the
process would strengthen domestic economies and make their nations self-sufficient. To
accomplish this, a variety of measures could be taken into effect, include the aforementioned
tariffs, subsidies, and more. It was an economic theory that was insular, protectionist, and – for
all intents and purposes – Peronist.
What is peculiar, however, is that the policies that Prebisch helped to implement were not
at all in line with his work in the past; in fact, it appeared as though Prebisch suffered from a
“’Dr. Jekyll and Mr. Hyde’ complex” with respect to his implemented policies as economic
advisor (Sikkink 1988, 95). Whereas he advised the new military regime to reverse the relative
prices of agricultural goods so as to “expand exports and thus generate the foreign exchange
necessary for capital goods to support continued industrialization”, he was also the creator of the
Prebisch-Singer hypothesis, a proposition that “net barter terms of trade between primary
products and manufactures have been subject to a long-run downward trend” (1988, 96; J. Toye
and R. Toye 2003, 437). It is important to note that the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis served as the
basis for the implementation of ISI in Latin American nations, including Perón’s Argentina. The
totality of Peronism during this time was predicated upon flexibility, the strengthening of
national identity, and the protection of its accumulated power (both political and economic). This
means that while other political parties might have been criticized and castigated for the
implementation of policies that were in stark contrast to their campaign platforms, Peronist
coalitions did not suffer from the same shortcoming; as the populist labor party of the time of
Perón, it received immense levels of support from large swathes of the Argentine people. And
until the 1980s, the Peronist party was the de facto labor party within the country, consisting of
mostly labor unions and members of the middle and working classes.
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But a byproduct of its ideological fluidity, adaptability, and resiliency is the fact that the
Peronist coalition is constantly evolving to retain its hold on the nation’s politics; to that end, it
has changed remarkably since its creation. While the movement may have its roots in laborism
(i.e., support of labor and trade unions), the 1980s brought forth an overhaul of the ideological
and coalitional structures of the party itself, representing an evolution of both the economics and
politics of Peronism. With the ousting of the military dictatorship in 1983, “labor [as a driving
force] lost influence vis-à-vis the newly elected governors and mayors. At this point, Peronism
turned into a political force based upon extended clientelistic networks” (Gambini 1999). Within
the decade of the 1980s, the Peronist coalition transmogrified from the “de facto labor party into
a predominantly patronage-based party” (Levitsky 2003, 107). In doing so, the robust
organizational structure was overhauled and recreated, with the new patronage networks
replacing the labor unions as its main link to its voting populus. With the reconstitution of the
coalition structure came a new president, the neoliberal Carlos Menem. In sharp contrast to
Perón’s party, Menem took advantage of the “weakly institutionalized nature” of the party and
“facilitated the removal of old-guard leaders and permitted the entry and rise of new blood into
the party leadership” (3). He removed the labor union as his linkage to the people, and instead
opted to fortify the local, provincial, and national structure of the Peronists to reach the entirety
of the nation.
President Carlos Menem had – in short – reconstituted his party’s support base without
changing the party’s ultimate goal of retaining power by limiting the influence of the labor
unions, which acted as intermediaries between the party and the people. But many core
components of the Peronist political alliance had remained the same. As previously stated, the
first iteration of the Peronist party coalition consisted mainly of labor unions, industrialists, and
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the working class. With the exception of the unions (and more specifically, union leadership),
these sections had – by and large – stayed within the Peronist electoral constituency; in fact,
Peronism’s close ties to domestic industries (as well as organized labor as a whole) were seen as
“obstacles” during the wave of liberal reforms that occurred in the mid to late 1980s in Argentina
(Levitsky 2001, 28). In its stead, patronage grew in prominence, as the newly formed networks
“provided social protection [for the urban working class] through clientelism” (Tekiner 2020,
273).
Another sector that aided the Peronists in maintaining political dominance during this
time of sociopolitical upheaval was the alliance made up of the various provincial governors
within Argentina. Between the 1983 and 1999 general elections, Peronists had constituted over
50% of the total number of governors in every election, with some years as high as 73.9% (Calvo
and Murillo 2004, 746). Moreover, while opposition victories in gubernatorial elections ranged
from “two to seven… those of the Peronists ranged from 12 to 17” (747). This remarkable level
of gubernatorial continuity had been (and continues to be) instrumental in the Peronist coalitions’
success, as the ideological homogeneity had allowed for the people involved to reap the benefits
of patronage for decades. But what would these governors be without the very people that voted
for them? The Peronists were no longer the champions of the people; instead, they were now the
leaders of the political machine. This remains true to this day, as modern-day Peronist coalitions
(including the current president, who served as the Chief of the Cabinet of Ministers to Cristina
Fernández de Kirchner, who in turn was First Lady to Néstor Kirchner, who ruled from 2003 to
2007) are more reminiscent of a patronage-based alliance made up of clientelistic party machines
that dictate the ebb and flow of the party’s linkages to the voting population. The Peronist
coalitions of Menem were not entirely devoid of popular support from the masses; but an
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analysis of actions taken by his administration in the waxing years of the 1990s provide evidence
that would suggest otherwise.
The economic crisis of the 1980s was international in its scope; however, it impacted the
developing nations of Latin America particularly badly. 1989 had the highest rates of inflation in
Argentina’s history. In addition to this, 1989 was also the year “in which the deficit peaked”
(Buera, Navarro, and Nicolini 2011, 145). This was the political climate into which Peronist
president Carlos Menem was thrust. In order to combat the rampant levels of hyperinflation and
general economic catastrophe, President Menem implemented “profound reforms” that were –
for the most part – in stark contrast to the tenets of the “traditional constituency of the Peronist
party” (Bambaci, Saront, and Tommasi 2002, 75). His policies could be described as being
neoliberal; some of his macroeconomic policies were reminiscent of the “Washington
Consensus,” as they brought about a wave of privatization and financial liberalization (76). It
was during this time that YPF – one of the world’s largest energy companies – was privatized, a
move which would later be reversed during the Cristina Kirchner administration decades later
(Gallegos 2013). By this point, it becomes clear that Menem represented a complete departure
from his predecessors; his presidency was a cacophony of policies aimed at privatizing and neoliberalizing a nation under immense economic duress, hyperinflation, and popular dissent. But
not only did Menem’s policies during the decade of the 1990s starkly contrast the tenets of
Peronism up until this point, they also had a profound – and catastrophic – impact on the future
of Argentina, an issue that can only be elucidated within the context of Menemist – and Peronist
– economics
First and foremost, the economic policies passed by the Menem administration inflated
the real value of the Argentine currency (at this point in time, the Austral, and later, the
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Argentine Peso). With a fixed rate of exchange to the U.S. dollar, any fluctuations in the price of
the dollar had massive ramifications across the entirety of the economy (Setser and Gelpern
2006, 466). Second and relatedly, the fixed exchange rate meant that domestic financial contracts
were often conducted in U.S. dollars. This, coupled with an appreciating U.S. dollar of the late
1990s and falling prices of commodities across the world, meant that Argentina's
competitiveness in international markets was severely limited as the strong domestic currency
hurts exports from the country. Finally, the currency convertibility system (responsible for
pegging the Argentine currency to the U.S.) devolved into yet another “organizing device” to be
used by political actors of the nation for their own purposes (466). The problem was not the
fixed-rate convertibility, however. As a point of comparison, Hong Kong adopted similar
convertibility measures, but was able to avoid a financial meltdown in the midst of the broader
Asian financial crisis of 1997 (Carson and Clark 2013). The problem, then, was the instability
and fragility of the domestic financial institutions that governed the economy of the nation. And
it was the failure of Menem to properly redress and remediate the adverse impacts of the 1989
financial crisis that led to the Argentine “Great Depression” of 2001. This financial crisis came
as a surprise to no one; in fact, it was the culmination of decades of stagnation and poor
policymaking. Thanks in due part to Argentina’s dependence on the International Monetary Fund
(IMF) for external financing – combined with the nation’s inability to pay back these debts – the
country found itself in both a domestic and external sovereign debt crisis, resulting in rampant
levels of poverty and unemployment (Setser and Gelpern 2006, 470). It was within this context
that Peronism went through yet another transformation in the burgeoning years of the 21st
century.
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However, this new “form” of Peronism was not so much another iteration, but rather, a
derivation of it. Referred to as Kirchnerism (named after Argentine presidents Néstor Kirchner
and Cristina Fernández de Kirchner), this new ideology has come to dominate the scope of
Argentine politics since the election of Néstor Kirchner in 2003, whose political ideology is
oftentimes classified as being a socialist form of Peronism (Levitsky 2011, 285). Moreover, it
deviates from the pragmatic, fluid nature of Peronism; instead, Kirchnerism is more dogmatic,
left-wing populist, and staunchly anti-neoliberal. Néstor Kirchner was initially elected under the
PJ platform; once in office, however, his rhetoric became more and more critical of his Peronist
predecessors. Namely, the Kirchner administration sharply criticized the market-oriented reforms
of the (neoliberal) opponent Carlos Menem.
This highlights the stubborn rigidity of this new ideology, as well as the differences in the
makeup of the coalitions; whereas traditional Peronists were willing to adapt and change to
extenuating circumstances for the survival of the party as a whole (as demonstrated by its radical
transformation from a pro-labor to a “patronage-oriented machine party”), Kirchnerism relied on
rallying radical popular support from the masses to sustain its continued existence. Whereas
Peronism had historically been anti-socialist (and anti-capitalist), Kirchnerism can be viewed as
a left-wing interpretation of Peronism. It heavily relied on the manipulation and obfuscation of
regulatory and macroeconomic policies to achieve its goals. Kirchner even went so far as to
vilify the IMF, blaming the organization for the economic crisis that had destroyed much of the
nation’s economy in the early years of the 21 st century (289). But despite its differences, the
composition of social, economic, and political actors who make up the current Kirchnerist
coalition bears a large resemblance to the coalitions of the past. A high-level overview reveals
that the Kirchnerist alliance – much like its historical counterparts – is comprised of labor
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unions, domestic industrialist, Peronist governors, and the blue-collar Argentine working class.
But unlike the Peronist coalitions during the days of Perón, the Kirchnerist administrations have
also received tremendous support from the workers within the informal sector; this meant that –
in addition to the blue-collar Argentine worker – the demographic of popular support now
included “the unemployed and slum dwellers” (Murillo and Zarazaga 2020, 128).
This new addition to the stratum of the working-class constituency is incredibly
significant for a variety of reasons. First and foremost, their mere existence and continued
growth is a result of the economic turmoil of the early 1990s and 2000s during the presidency of
Carlos Menem. His precipitous failures to reign in foreign debt and rampant inflation resulted in
the destruction of the Argentine economy, in addition to the loss of thousands of jobs across the
country. With no magical reversal of fortunes in sight, many Argentines turned to the informal
labor sector, finding employment in whatever form they could for hopes of achieving financial
survival. As Néstor’s platform grew to be increasingly anti-Menem and anti-neoliberal, he found
a broad and fervent base of support from this growing (both in size and discontent) population of
the working class. Second and relatedly, the addition of the informal sector is significant due to
the sheer number of individuals it constitutes. By 2003, the percentage of non-registered wage
earners in Argentina rose to 41% of the total waged labor force, up from 29% in 1993 (Beccaria
and Groisman 2016, 124). While indicative of the underdevelopment of Argentina’s economy in
a modern context, the growth in the informal sector – as well as its eventual organization –
highlights the strength of Peronist sociopolitical alliances; in bringing together the marginalized
workers in Argentine society together under one coalition, Kirchner was able to resolidify a
constituency that had lost faith in governmental institutions following the economic turmoil of
the 90s and 2000s.
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To rectify and reverse the detrimental effects had by the 2001 Argentine financial crisis,
the Kirchner administration enacted a cacophony of populist and protectionist policies that drew
the ire of many organizations and groups across the country. This was done through three general
initiatives. First was the implementation of price controls and export quotas on products such as
gasoline, milk, beef, and agricultural goods. Second, the administration put into place price
controls on public utilities such as water, electricity, and communication systems. Finally, they
provided subsidies to businessmen working in industries such as energy, transport, and food
production. All in all, these measures sought to “protect popular sectors’ short-run income”
(Levitsky 2011, 291). These policies alienated large swathes of the country, especially those
directly involved in the agricultural and gas industries. But in spite of the venomous rhetoric
espoused against capitalism and neoliberalism, the Kirchner administrations (Néstor Kircher
from 2003-2007, Cristina Kirchner from 2007-2015) did surprisingly little to reverse the
privatization (linked to the neoliberal policies of the Menem administration) of the 1990s, with
only a small amount of re-nationalization of key sectors such as the postal service,
telecommunications, and pensions (Manzetti 2016). And with the Peronist ideological split that
occurred in 2015 notwithstanding (a split which resulted in the election of conservative Mauricio
Macri to the presidency), the support of the common people remained strong. Regardless of
whether they voted for the more conservative wing or the more liberal one, the Peronist coalition
was ultimately able to bridge this gap; and in 2019, the Fernández-Kirchner alliance came into
power.
So how can Kirchnerism be contextualized within the broader scope of Peronism? And
would it be acceptable – and accurate – to classify Kirchnerism as a form of Peronism, or should
it be classified as something else entirely? An argument can be made that despite the numerous
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differences, Kirchnerism and Peronism, as well as the more neoliberal Menemism, are more
closely aligned than they appear at face value. Argentina’s long history with Peronist ideologies
and ideals has led some scholars to typify it as a “Peronist democracy,” as opposed to a
delegative or a hyper-presidential one (Tekiner 2020, 258). Following the same logic, then, the
Menem administration can be labeled as “Peronist neoliberalism,” and the Kirchner
administrations as “Peronist socialism.” The fluidity of the Peronist coalitional structure has
allowed for its makeup to remain fairly constant, regardless of the ideological changes that have
taken place within the past seven decades. But not only are the coalitions throughout history
similar with regards to composition, they – not shockingly – also have very similar policy
orientations. Just like how Perón espoused the important of social programs to uplift the
marginalized Argentines during the 1950s, the same was done in wake of the 2001 financial
crisis by the Duhalde administration, wherein conditional cash transfer programs were
implemented to alleviate the financial burden placed upon the populus (Galasso and Ravallion
2004, 370). Just like Perón’s use of government intervention in lieu of more internationalism, the
new Fernández presidency has placed an emphasis on “political sovereignty [and] economic
independence” (Tekiner 2020, 258). This continuity within policy is yet another example of the
continuation of Peronist traditions through its various coalitions; and it is this continuity that
allows for the comparative analysis of economic policies between crises, presidencies, and
coalitions throughout history.
But what exactly are Peronist economic policies, and how can they be contextualized
within Argentina’s history? In terms of Peronist economics, the evolution of the party
constitution seems to have no causal effect. And neither the waxing of patronage nor the waning
of laborism changed the inherent problem at hand, that of Argentina’s gradual – yet recognizable
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– stagnation. Rafael Di Tella and Juan Dubra affirm the Díaz Alejandro hypothesis, which
blames Argentina’s “relative decline to the replacement of the export-oriented, market friendly
policies of the early 1900s by populist, interventionist policies around the time of the great
depression” (Di Tella and Dubra 2017, 6). They point to the time around the election of Juan
Domingo Perón as the start of the period of “early retardation” of the Argentine economy, a
trend which continues (albeit with crests and troughs) to this day. According to Di Tella and
Dubra, Peronist economics is predicated upon Argentina’s long history of interventionism and
populism and is – in short – a type of crony capitalism that was one of the main causes of the
“retardation” of the nation’s growth starting in the middle of the 20th century (6). Crony
capitalism is defined as “enterprises which depend on the state´s benevolence to be allowed to
import raw material or other inputs, to win contracts for public works, to be allowed to export…”
(Beker 2016, 4). In essence, crony capitalism – the system that most resembles Argentina’s
economic system – ensures that businessmen “spend more time in public offices dealing with
paperwork and lobbying than in their production plants” (4). In 2014, the English newspaper The
Economist set out to define and delineate the extent of crony-capitalist countries in the world; to
that end, they created what is now known as the crony-capitalism index in order to highlight their
findings. By seeking to calculate the number of economic rent-seekers in ten industries highly
susceptible to monopolization and corruption (those being casinos, coal, palm oil and timber
production, national defense, investment banking, infrastructure and pipelines, ports, airports,
real estate and construction, steel and metal production, mining and commodities, and telecoms
services), The Economist created an easily quantifiable metric to compare one country to another
(The Economist 2021). To no surprise, the top of the chart is dominated by Russia; ten spots
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down at number 11, however, is Argentina, with over 70% of its wealth coming in the form of
crony-capitalist policies and institutions.
Through this, a (relatively) concise definition of Peronist economics can be formulated.
Peronist economic policy is, then, a form of crony capitalism that has its origins in both populist
and nationalist rhetoric. It employs both protectionist strategies (such as ISI), and more liberal
ones. But going beyond the rational discourses on economic policies coming from both Peronist
and anti-Peronists, Peronism has “a marked social-cultural component” which allows for
political diatribe to happen “at a visceral level” (Ostiguy 1997, 37). In this context, it is
impossible to separate the politics from the policy. Peronism is more than just an ideology – it is
a “flexible… brand” (Calvo and Murillo 2012, 148). It emphasizes the retention of power and
national dominance. It is focused on the ultimate goal: survival. For the Peronist brand to
survive, it has to constantly change and adapt, and will not let any rival faction (or individual)
get in its way. It is important to bear this fact in mind as one continues to analyze the impact of
Peronism on the Argentine economy; Peronism often supersedes policies and politics.
Nobel laureate and famed economist Simon Kuznets was once to have said that there are
four types of countries in the world: “the developed, the underdeveloped, Japan, and Argentina”
(Saiegh 1996, 3). Indeed, as seen in the literature above, the history of Argentina’s economy
since 1946 has been mired with periods of time that seem to starkly contrast one another in every
capacity. The first Peronist period of 1946-1955 was dominated by Perón himself, whose
populist and quasi-fascist leadership galvanized much of the lower and middle-class population
in Argentina. The subsequent period until 1973 saw a complete and utter rejection of Peronism
as a whole, with the movement being banned outright by the ensuing military junta. Perón’s third
term – coupled with his wife’s tenure after his death – followed closely after the successful
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neoliberal coup d’état of General Augusto Pinochet in neighboring Chile and was demarcated by
increasing turmoil within the right- and left-wing factions within the Peronist movement. The
coup on Isabel Perón’s regime in 1976 preceded what is now known as the “Dirty War,” a period
of state-sanctioned terrorism where thousands of political dissidents (mostly communists and
left-wing Peronists) were murdered or “disappeared” by military death squads (BA Times
2021b). The presidency of Carlos Menem from 1989 to 1999 deviated substantially from the
original tenets of Peronism, as it appeared to adhere to the values of neoliberalism more so than
any other economic ideology. And after the economic collapse in 2001 during the presidencies of
Fernando de la Rúa and Eduardo Duhalde came the final – and most current – iteration of
Peronism, the presidencies of the Néstor and Cristina Kirchner.
Not only does Peronism have a rich, convoluted history that has ingratiated itself within
Argentina’s political climate, it continues to have a salient effect to this day. Conceptualizing
Peronist economics through the lens of past economic crises provides for an excellent starting
point for a study on the current crisis at hand. And by understanding the interplay between the
economic and political tenets of this ideology – as well as its evolution throughout the course of
the past few decades – it then becomes possible to apply the same principles to the context at
hand in a comparative policy analysis.
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Chapter 2: Description and Analysis of Peronist/Kirchnerist Electoral Coalitions
of Support

2a. Introduction
The 2021 midterm elections in Argentina proved to be devastating for the Fernández
administration, as the Kirchnerist Frente de Todos coalition suffered setbacks in every corner of
the nation of Argentina. In contrast to the center right Juntos por el Cambio (JxC) coalition
which garnered 40.1% of votes in the Buenos Aires province, Fernández’s Frente de Todos
(FdT) received a paltry 38.4%, while losing ground in Santa Fe and Córdoba, as well as many
other important districts (Associated Press 2021). The JxC was victorious in 13 of the 24 districts
in the nation, marking the first time in nearly 40 years that a Peronist coalition has lost its
majority in both chambers of Congress (Spezzapria 2021). This is a shocking turn of events that
will have numerous – and severe – ramifications on the effectiveness of the Fernández
administration, as well as the political alliance as a whole. First and foremost, this electoral
defeat on a nationwide scale highlights the sentiments of the court of public opinion: it is evident
that the Argentine people are dissatisfied with the ways in which the current governing coalition
has handled the Coronavirus pandemic and have voted accordingly. Second, the loss of the
coalitional majority in both houses of Congress means that compromises and concessions will be
of the upmost importance when it comes to achieving the coalition agenda. Third and finally, the
result of the election elucidates the inherent weakness of Frente de Todos, an alliance of vastly
differing ideologies that was “very effective from an electoral point of view, but very ineffective
in governing” (Dennis 2021). Regardless of the causes of this electoral catastrophe, however, one
thing remains clear: Peronism in Argentine politics is not what it once was. To that end, how has
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the Peronist electoral coalition evolved over the years, and in what ways have these evolutions
manifested themselves within the greater political realm?
2b. Alberto Fernández’s Frente de Todos
The newest iteration of the Peronist political machine is the Frente de Todos, a coalition
formed for the 2019 elections that is comprised of various political, economic, and social sectors.
While certainly multidimensional and infinitely difficult to accurately quantify, the FdT is
essentially comprised of four major political sectors.
The first among these is the Partido Justicialista (PJ), the main Peronist party that has
existed in some capacity since the days of Juan Perón himself. It is far and away the largest
faction within Peronism; in fact, the PJ alone constitutes 91 members of the Chamber of
Deputies and 11 of the provincial governors in the nation. A byproduct of its enormity, the PJ
serves as somewhat of a “catch-all” party within the Peronist alliance, sacrificing ideological
homogeneity (with a very loosely defined set of guiding principles) to gain a large allencompassing constituency. This quasi-populist mindset is very Peronist in nature and continues
to define – not just the PJ – but the totality of Peronism. The second group consists of those
Peronists and anti-Peronists that instead adhere to the principles of Kirchnerism, a movement
spearheaded by former president Cristina Fernández de Kirchner. Often described as a leftist
splinter sect of Peronism (which by all accounts, is left-of-center to begin with), Kirchnerism
began with the presidency of Néstor Kirchner in 2003. Since then, it has grown in popularity,
much to the chagrin of many “traditional” Peronists. The third major sector is the Frente
Renovador, a formerly dissident and anti-Kirchnerist wing of the Peronist party that aims to
create “Peronism of the 21st Century” (Jorquera 2017). Members of the Frente Renovador – led
by the career politician Sergio Massa – are considered to be more right-of-center; and it was this
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ideological fracture that led to the mass exodus away from the leftist Kirchnerist alliance in
2013, giving rise to the election of the conservative Macri in 2015. The fourth and final sector
consists of Peronist governors, leaders of the 23 provincias (provinces) of Argentina, as well as
Federal District of Buenos Aires. Of the 24, 14 are either affiliated with FdT or the Partido
Justicialista (PJ), the main Peronist political party; this constitutes a clear majority within the
Argentine gubernatorial landscape. In addition to the various sects of Peronism, included within
the electoral coalition are the minor parties that adhere to a variety of differing ideologies;
included amongst this ideological smorgasbord are parties aligned with the tenets of “maoismo,”
a political ideology synonymous with communism within Argentina (Clarín 2022).
With respect to the breadth of different ideologies, the FdT is certainly diverse; it
receives support from the alliance of governors, the Frente Renovador (both of which are both
right-of-center), the Kirchnerist faithful, the left-of-center social movements (such as the
piqueteros), the aforementioned communist parties, as well as the other regional parties that exist
within Argentina. These factions have come together to form the current Peronist coalition, one
that has the widest breadth of support the nation has ever seen. The FdT also receives support
from the various sub-factions within Peronism and Kirchnerism. For example, parties such as
Proyecto Sur – a progressive Peronist party that fights for the nationalization of industries
privatized by former president Carlos Menem – are part of the broader Peronist coalition, even if
their tenets don’t entirely align (Pagina/12 2015). As of the 2021 midterm elections, 36 of the 72
members of the upper Argentine Senate (Senado de la nación Argentina) and 91 of the 257
members of the lower Chamber of Deputies (Cámara de Diputados) are affiliated with the FdT
(PJ 2022).

28
But the FdT is not a mere political alliance; many social, domestic, and foreign actors are
also a part of the new coalition. Adhering to Peronist traditions, the FdT has support from most
of the large labor unions across the country, including the Argentine Workers’ Central Union
(CGT). To that end, they have a wide base of support from blue-collar workers, as well as
workers in the ancillary sectors (such as retail, hospitality, the public sector etc.). The FdT –
along with Peronism as a whole – is also popular with lower-income workers, as well as workers
in the informal labor sector, due to their emphasis on the promotion of labor and workers’ rights
throughout its history. This current iteration of Peronism does highlight a marked difference
between it and some of its predecessors (namely, the Peronist coalition during the Menem
administration) in that previous Peronist alliances were considered to be more center-right and
neoliberal. In contrast to these previous coalitions, the FdT is staunchly anti-neoliberal, and has
sought to cut its ties to its free-market liberal predecessors of the 1990s. The table below depicts
a comprehensive list of parties – both national and regional – within the Peronist electoral
constituency since Néstor Kirchner’s FPV.
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This ideological diversity, however, did little for the FdT during the most recent election.
As mentioned previously, the 2021 midterms cemented the JxC coalition’s status as a significant
and competitive political rival to the Peronist FdT, all the while giving credence to the “common
perception that the country’s political elite are out of touch with reality” (Provitina 2021). But
this is not a problem endemic within just the FdT. In fact, both the FdT and JxC lost supporters
in droves, with electoral participation at 71%, the lowest figure since 1983, the year democracy
was reinstated in Argentina (Dellacha 2021). This election clearly highlights the growing
frustration of the Argentine people, whose country’s response to the COVID-19 pandemic – as
well as the myriad of problems that came about as a result – has been devastatingly inadequate.
To castigate the ineffectiveness of the current system, political malcontents adopted the
rallying cry “que se vayan todos” (“let them all go”), an homage to the protests during the
financial crisis of 2001 wherein then-President Fernando de la Rúa was forced to resign
following his failure to effectively mitigate the adverse effects of the economic and political
crises of his time (Provitina 2021). In this regard, political instability and the formation of new
electoral coalitions seem to be inextricably linked. It was the inaction of the Frente de Todos that
led to the rise in support for the Juntos por el Cambio. And it was the failures of the coalition of
Fernando De la Rúa that led to the formation of Néstor Kirchner’s Frente para la Victoria.

2c. Néstor Kirchner’s Frente para la Victoria
Founded on the heels of the 2001 recession in Argentina, the Frente para la Victoria
(FPV) remained the dominant political coalition in Argentina until the 2015 election cycle
(although the coalition was not officially disbanded until 2017). While the constitution of the
coalition certainly evolved and changed over the course of the decade, the core of the FPV
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consisted of the Peronist Partido Justicialista and Frente Grande, the Kirchnerist Kolina and
Nuevo Encuentro parties, the socialist Partido Intransigente and Partido Solidario, the
Communist party (Partido Comunista), and the Partido Humanista.
In comparison to the 2021 midterm elections – which occurred after the initial success of
the FdT in 2019 – the midterm elections of 2005 were a landslide in favor of the incumbent
president’s political coalition. Though this election is often demarcated by the election of First
Lady Cristina Kirchner to the Argentine Senate as the representative of the Buenos Aires
province (who also defeated former First Lady Hilda González de Duhalde in the process), it also
served as a massive vote of confidence in the newly formed Kirchnerist coalition (El Mundo
2005). To that end, the coalition won 69 of the 127 seats (54%) up for election in the Chamber of
Deputies, a sharp contrast to the 50 seats (39%) won during the 2021 elections by the FdT
(Ministerio del Interior 2005). In the upper house of Congress, the FPV won 17 of 24 seats
(71%) in 2005, while the FdT won a paltry 9 of 24 (38%) in 2021.
At first glance, the disparity between the successes of the Kirchnerist coalition of 2005
and 2021 are glaring. Both elections came at the halfway point of the freshly elected Peronist
president’s tenure, at a time when the country had been suffering through economic and social
calamities. While it must be recognized that this comparison is not an entirely commensurate one
(due to the fact that policies remediating the 2001 crisis had already been passed by the time
Néstor took office), the results can be used as a rough barometer to gauge the success of the
coalition in navigating the country through the respective crises. For the 2005 FPV, the crisis at
hand was the 2001 Great Depression; for the 2021 FdT, the answer is obvious. While
fundamentally different crises, one thing is certain: the voters in the 2021 election clearly neither

31
approved of – nor commended – the underwhelming efforts of the national government in
mitigating the adverse effects of the COVID-19 pandemic.
In what other ways has the FdT shown itself to be the true Kirchnerist successor to the
FPV? The most obvious answer is found within the makeup of the coalitions themselves. Of the
eight main political parties that made up the bulk of the Frente para la Victoria, seven are also
currently a part of Fernández’s Frente de Todos. This includes the Partido Justicialista, the
single largest political party in the Argentine congress.

2d. Cristina Kirchner’s Unidad Ciudadana
In contrast to the two aforementioned political coalitions, however, Cristina Fernández de
Kirchner’s Unidad Ciudadana (UC) never reached the national levels of political success as its
predecessor and eventual successor. The UC coalition was formed ahead of the 2017 midterm
elections with the campaign slogan “UNITE para #FrenarElSaqueo” (Unite to Stop the Looting)
by former president and senator Cristina Fernández de Kirchner (Pagina/12 2017). In short, this
was a decentralized Peronist effort united around a personalist leader in Cristina to defeat the
center-right and conservative coalition Juntos por el Cambio (Together for Change) that had won
the 2015 presidential election, ending a national Peronist regime that had ruled the nation for
over a decade. It was also the first Peronist coalition formed without the expressed support of the
PJ; in fact, the UC had actually poached several parties from the FPV alliance, of which Cristina
herself had been a leader (2017).
The coalition consisted of the Peronist Frente Grande and Compromiso Federal parties,
as well as the Kirchnerist parties of Nuevo Encuentro, Partido de la Victoria, and Kolina (La
Nación 2017). The coalitional makeup of the UC serves as another important distinction between

32
it and the other Peronist political alliances; whereas both the FdT and FPV consisted of a
smorgasbord of ideologically diverse political parties from all across the country, the UC was
neither ideologically nor geographically diverse. At its core, it was a Kirchnerist coalition held
together by Cristina Fernández de Kirchner herself, created with the expressed intent of
mitigating the effectiveness of center-right president Mauricio Macri. To that end, all 15 of the
points within the campaign platform serve as scathing criticisms of Macri. For instance, point 10,
“Mujer. Iguales y Vivas” (Women. Equal and Alive) is a response to a quote by Macri wherein
he is credited to have said “all women like compliments, even if they’re told what a nice a-- they
have” (2017)1. This is not to say that the entire platform was a vitriolic rejection of Macri and his
center-right policies, but rather, a platform predicated upon capitalizing on the mistakes and
misfortunes of the opposition.
In regard to the other positions taken up by the coalition platform, they are ideologically
homogeneous to those of its predecessor, the FPV. The FPV electoral platform for the 2011
election states that one of its three main goals for the upcoming election was the continuation of
economic policies that would diminish the wealth gap between rich and poor as to make
Argentina the “most egalitarian nation in Latin America”; the platform proudly states, “gone are
the times when the pocket of the workers was the adjustment variable” (Frente para la Victoria
2011). Similarly, the first of the campaign promises of the Unidad Ciudadana was to “recuperate
what was lost: employment, salary, and working conditions.” To do this, the UC planned to
increase purchasing power of the employee, all the while implementing firing bans for at least
one year (Pagina/12 2017). Feasibility of the plans aside, it becomes clear that the basic premise
of the Kirchnerist UC were similar to those of the FPV, highlighting their strong and

1

“A todas las mujeres les gustan los piropos, aunque les digan qué lindo culo tenés”
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ideologically homogenous coalition of support. But how does the UC compare to the FdT, and
how do all three coalitions demonstrate the evolution of Peronism in a political context?

2e. Political Analysis of Coalitional Makeup
As stated previously, the FdT is a diverse political and social coalition that serves as the
newest iteration of the Peronist/Kirchnerist traditions present in Argentina. To that end, many of
the actors that have taken part in previous Peronist coalitions exist in some capacity in FdT,
albeit with minute differences. From a political standpoint, every single major party within FPV
is included within the FdT, with the largest actor being the Partido Justicialista (of which current
president Alberto Fernández is the leader). Despite the similarities, however, there are also a
myriad of differences that separate the coalitions.
First and foremost, the three Peronist/Kirchnerist coalitions were formed for vastly
different reasons. With an impending presidential election, a hugely unpopular $57 billion IMF
loan taken out by then-current president Mauricio Macri, and the economic health of the nation
on the line, the FdT was formed with the Peronists’ backs against the wall. As the UC had shown
just two years earlier, none of the splinter Peronist coalitions could win without each other.
President Alberto Fernández and Vice President Cristina Kirchner had to enlist the help of rightof-center Peronist dissident Sergio Massa, leader of the Frente Renovador. The Peronists needed
the broadest alliance possible to assume the presidency, a fact that all Peronists recognized as the
undeniable truth. In contrast, the Unidad Ciudadana was formed in the aftermath of Cristina
Kirchner’s 2nd term as president. With Cristina unable to run for a 3rd consecutive term, the 2015
presidential elections brought forth much instability and change within the political landscape;
ultimately, it became a three-way race between Peronist Daniel Scioli (representative of the
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FPV), dissident Peronist Sergio Massa, and conservative Mauricio Macri. With Macri’s eventual
victory over the fractured Peronist coalitions, Cristina Kirchner sought to use her personalistic
influences to create a new electoral alliance that was purportedly anti-Macri. But the reality is
that the coalition was more pro-Cristina than it was anti-anyone; this highlights the largest
difference between these two coalitions. Cristina – as the figurehead and leader of the UC – was
not universally popular, even amongst fellow Peronists (a fact highlighted by the very splintering
of the FPV itself in 2015). This provides the perfect segue into the second difference, the nature
of the political coalitions.
Both the FPV and UC had a strong attachment to the leadership of former presidents
Néstor and Cristina Kirchner; in this regard, both can be typified as a personalist political
coalition wherein the power is firmly vested in the hands of one individual. This is exemplified
by the passage of the “superpowers” law during the Néstor presidency in 2006, which gave the
president the permanent power to “alter budget spending without congressional approval and
[normalized the president’s] ability to use emergency executive decrees” (Mander 2006). What’s
more, this bill was first introduced in the Senate by then-Senator Cristina Kirchner, who then
successfully ran for the presidency following the end of her husband’s tenure. But Cristina was
not the only reason for the success of this legislation; while she may have initiated its passage, it
was thanks to Néstor’s firm and consolidated leadership of his political coalition that the bill was
passed. Regardless of the legality and morality of the law at hand, this is a clear example of the
personalistic leadership exemplified by both Kirchner presidents during their respective
administrations.
In contrast, the leadership of the FdT has been fractured and tenuous since its inception.
After the monumental losses incurred by the FdT in the most recent election, Vice President
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Kirchner penned an open – and vitriolic – letter to her superior, accusing him of “pursuing
‘mistaken’ fiscal policies that exacerbated Argentina’s economic crisis already made worse by
the COVID-19 pandemic” (Al Jazeera 2021). Shockingly, this is not the first time a rift between
these two Peronist leaders has been made public; in fact, Alberto has had a rocky relationship
with the Kirchner family dating back to his time spent as Néstor’s head of cabinet ministers
between 2003 to 2008. In 2008, he resigned from his position amidst an “acrimonious falling out
with Ms. Fernández” (Reuters 2019). It seems puzzling, then, that Alberto would choose Cristina
as his running mate; however, this move highlights the bigger purpose of their alliance. Whereas
the FPV came together under the guidance and leadership of Néstor, the FdT came together out
of necessity with the purpose of defeating the conservative Mauricio Macri, turning one-time
enemies into strange bedfellows. In this regard, the UC is more similar to the FPV in that they
operated with centralized leadership and a personalistic leader at the helm.
A third difference between these Peronist alliances is the political composition itself. It is
true that all the parties of the FPV and the UC are included in the FdT; but the opposite is not the
case. The FdT is a smorgasbord of center-left and left-wing parties whose common thread is that
they were all opposed to the reelection of Mauricio Macri. For one reason or another, they were
all united against a common cause, the defeat of a conservative who they viewed as someone
incapable of rectifying the economic crisis of their nation. While this forced diversity has caused
internal rifts and a lack of unity – as evidenced by the major losses incurred in 2021 – it sets the
FdT apart from the other coalitions in that they were more ideologically homogeneous. To drive
home the point of unity, diversity, and inclusion, the newly created logo included the phrase
“todos, todas, tod@s”, which are the masculine, feminine, and gender-neutral spellings of the
Spanish word for “all” (Pagina/12 2017). The UC was seen as a Kirchnerist splinter faction
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within the Peronist party that adhered closer to the tenets of Kirchnerism more so than Peronism,
while the FPV had a more nationally unified base of support (albeit, more diverse ideologically
than the UC). Moreover, the FdT is demarcated by the return of politician Sergio Massa to the
Kirchnerist fold, who split from the FPV in 2013 to form his own party, the Frente Renovador.
This is significant in that Massa was seen as a staunch anti-Kirchnerist following the leaked
revelation that he had lambasted both Kirchner presidents, going so far as to call Néstor a
“‘psychopath… a monster’ whose ‘bully approach’ to politics shows his sense of inferiority.” He
was also critical of Cristina, declaring that she had no power and that she was there to [follow]
orders” (MercoPress 2010). In fact, it was his souring relations with Cristina that had prompted
his exit from the Peronist coalition to begin with. After resigning from his position as Cristina’s
chief of staff (a position he served in from 2008-2009) due to the fact that he was left out “of
decision-making and, in many cases, punished for having his own thoughts within” the Kirchner
presidency, Massa’s return to the electoral coalition highlights the difference between it and its
previous iterations. And despite the seemingly personal reasons for Massa’s resignation, the crux
of their disagreement lay in their ideological differences. As a more traditional (and
conservative) Peronist, Massa had become disenfranchised with the left turn of the Kirchnerist
coalition. This contextualizes and justifies the creation of the new Peronist coaltion; the Frente
de Todos was not created ideologically, but out of necessity (24 Conurbano 2009).
Another important sector of Peronist political coalitions is the presence and power held
by the various governors of the provinces. Governors of Argentine provinces have high levels of
discretion with respect to the allocation of federal funds due to the [somewhat] decentralized and
party-centered nature of the national politics (Lodola 2010). To that end, gubernatorial support is
critical in attaining political success as president, as local Peronist governors are instrumental in
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garnering support from their respective provinces. As stated previously, 13 of the 23 governors
are members of the FdT coalition, of which 11 are representatives of the PJ. This begins to
explain the failures of the UC, as their coalition did not include the aforementioned party; and
due to the fact that governors are critical in garnering provincial legislative support, the lack
thereof makes it exponentially more difficult to achieve even the smallest of provincial electoral
victories. The power held by these governors in the FdT coalition is further highlighted by the
fact that between 2019 and 2021, the president of the Partido Justicialista was – in fact – former
governor of the San Juan Province, José Luis Rioja (Telám 2021). Together, these political
actors make up a strong plurality of political actors within the various Peronist coalitions.

2e. Social Analysis of Coalitional Makeup
But who – and what – constitutes the social actors of the Peronist FdT today? To
reiterate, the vast majority of the coalition has remained the same since the inception of Peronism
in the 1940s. The Argentine politic environment is predicated upon the strength of both the
president and the provincial governors; to that end, most of the federal distribution of funds is
decided “by the national and provincial executives”, demarcating the power that governors hold
in the state of Argentina as territorial leaders in their own right (Gonzalez and Mamone 2015,
24). Due to the clientelistic nature of the new iterations of Peronist coalitions, these governors –
in turn – play a critical role in the retention of power in Argentine politics, as their support
dictates the changing course of the coalition leadership vis-à-vis their influence over their
respective provinces. In addition to the powerful provincial governors, the lower class –
beneficiaries of “redistributive policies” such as the Universal Child Subsidy (AUH) – voted en
masse for the Kirchnerist ticket, as these social welfare measures persuaded the recipients into
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joining the Peronist fold (Calvo and Murillo 2012, 151). But with the fervent support of one
subsector, the FdT lost traction in another, the middle-class. While the Peronists running in
elections post-2003 were “rewarded… for [the] good economic times” brought on by the policies
of the FPV, the FdT failed to achieve any modicum of success – both economic and otherwise –
in fighting the pandemic (151). To that end, the voters responded accordingly, voting the FdT out
of the majority in both houses of congress.
One of the biggest social changes to the Peronist electoral constituency – however – has
been the inclusion of informal laborers, the subsector of the working-class constituency that only
came into prominence in the early 2000s. With its inclusion into the Peronist electoral alliance –
as well as the creation of the Confederación de Trabajadores de la Economia Popular (CTEP),
the labor union that encompasses a plurality of the informal laborers, called excluidos – the
informal sector has become, in a sense, formalized. Leaders such as Juan Grabois – whose
influence will be expanded upon in later chapters – emerged as representatives of the formerly
unrepresented, and it soon became evident that a synergetic relationship must be cultivated to
achieve electoral success within this constituency. To that end, it was the FPV’s approach and
firm commitment to deepening the social safety net for the lower and lower-middle class that
helped to re-establish their dominance in these demographic groups. Their efforts were also
aided by the “conjunctural rise of the Left across Latin America [colloquially referred to as] the
‘Pink Tide’” (Tekiner 2020, 269). This fact remains true with the FdT, whose 2019 electoral base
was partially made up of voters in poorer neighborhoods, despite the lackluster recovery efforts
in light of the pandemic. By September of 2019 – mere months before the presidential election –
“87% of the donations to [the Fernández campaign] came from individuals” for much smaller
amounts; in contrast, 90% of all contributions to the opposing incumbent Macri came from
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corporations (Crucianelli and Fitz-Patrick 2019). Peronist support from the masses is not a new
phenomenon; after arresting then-general Juan Perón for his inflammatory rhetoric against the
“business sector and the military government” in 1943, popular support from the masses was
instrumental in his election as president in 1946 (Tekiner 2020, 259).
Another change within the social sector has been in the rural population within
Argentina; literature has shown that while Perón himself received the highest levels of support
from the least developed rural counties, the FPV could not emulate such success (Smith 1972,
65). While there are a myriad of factors that resulted in this paradigm shift, the “tax hike[s] on
key agricultural exports” instituted during the post-2001 recession era soured the relation
irreparably (Calvo and Murillo 2012, 154). Such policies – while initially implemented to bring
the nation out of inflation – merely alienated and disenfranchised those affected. Despite an
influx in sales revenue, the aforementioned tax hikes incensed many, with some – such as
veteran Peronist mayor Dr. Fernando Fischer – declaring that the Kirchner administration was
“deaf and blind to the damage it is doing to the farm economy” of rural Argentina (Barrionuevo
2008). Despite its differences, the Peronist coalition has remained remarkably constant
throughout its existence in Argentina; but does this continuity manifest itself through policy?
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Chapter 3: An Analysis of COVID-Related Peronist Economic Policies Passed
Between March 2020-March 2022

3a. Introduction
With the preconditions for Peronist coalition building now understood, it then becomes
possible to conduct an in-depth analysis on the specific policies passed in the last two years by
said coalition. To do so effectively, however, it is necessary to demarcate the differences
between each set of policies (both with respect to origin and type) so as to allow for a more
robust understanding and conceptualization of the impact of Peronist coalitions on policy
formation in Argentina. The totality of the research has revealed 16 different policies passed
between March 2020-March 2022 that pertain to the economic recovery following the COVID19 pandemic. These policies fall under five main categories. These categories – as well as a brief
description of what they entail – are listed below:
1. Rent Policies and Eviction Bans: bills and executive decrees meant to protect renters
from price gouging, as well as the provision of other forms of protection for tenants (such
as the banning of eviction during the COVID-19 pandemic).
2. Firing Bans: bills and executive decrees meant to prohibit the dismissal of employers
without justified cause or due to a lack of work.
3. Tax Hikes/Exemptions: bills and executive decrees meant to either: a) alleviate the
burden of taxes, or b) increase the tax rate to pay for certain government programs.
4. Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT): bills and executive decrees meant to provide meantested monetary transfers to families.
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5. Business Ancillary Programs: bills and executive decrees meant to protect: a) employer
contributions to social security; b) salaries for workers in the private sector; c) health care
benefits for private sector workers; and d) assist businesses in paying for labor costs.

3b. Organization and Preliminary Analysis of Data
Table 2: Organization of Relevant Policy from March 2020-March 2022
Classification

Extension?
(Y/N)

PRO

Tax Exemption

-

Law 27605

Frente de Todos

Tax Hike

-

3/30/20

In Committee

Frente de Todos

Eviction Ban

-

Senate

4/2/20

In Committee

Frente de Todos

CCT

-

528/20

Senate

3/4/20

In Committee

Frente de Todos

Tax Exemption

-

Bill

682/20

Senate

4/20/20

In Committee

Frente de Todos

Rent Freeze

-

Decree

309/20

Executive

3/23/20

-

Frente de Todos

CCT

No

Decree

310/20

Executive

3/23/20

-

Frente de Todos

Firing Ban

No

Decree

319/20

Executive

3/29/20

-

Frente de Todos

Rent Freeze

No

Decree

320/20

Executive

3/29/20

-

Frente de Todos

Eviction Ban

No

Decree

329/20

Executive

3/31/20

-

Frente de Todos

Firing Ban

No

Decree

332/20

Executive

4/1/20

-

Frente de Todos

Salary Program

No

Decree

376/20

Executive

4/19/20

-

Frente de Todos

Salary Program

Yes (332/20)

Decree

767/20

Executive

9/24/20

-

Frente de Todos

Rent Freeze

Yes (319/20)

Decree

891/20

Executive

11/13/20

-

Frente de Todos

Firing Ban

Yes (Multiple)

Program

PEN

-

Frente de Todos

Salary Program

Type

Identifier

Origination

Introduced

Bill

961/20

Lower

3/27/20

In Committee

Bill

4534/20

Lower

11/18/20

Bill

487/20

Senate

Bill

505/20

Bill

-

-

Status

Coalition

-

Immediately, a high-level overview reveals certain trends that exist within the set of
policies. First, only a plurality of total policies are found to have originated from either house of
Congress. With the lower Chamber of Deputies introducing two and the Senate introducing four,
the rest were passed via executive decree. This reveals the timely nature of the current pandemic,
as bills originating from either house must go through a lengthy and strenuous process to become
a law (in addition to the fact that they most likely did not have the votes to pass such policies).
Policymaking through Congress has proven itself to be a slow-moving and cumbersome political
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tool that is ineffective for a fast-changing crisis such as the one at hand. To that end, executive
decrees provide a much faster pathway towards ratification, and were the main tool used by the
Fernández administration for the past two years. The use of executive decrees as the means to
enact economic reform is not new, however. The “Economic Emergency Act and the State
Reform Act” of the late 1980s – as well as the proliferation of the use of “necessity and urgency
decrees” – have given Argentine presidents near-unilateral policymaking abilities on the
economic front since the days of Menem (Llanos 2001, 71). Such presidential powers had
historically been used to approve policies regarding “salaries, public debt, and the restructuring
of public agencies”; this trend continues to this day, as the decrees of Fernández closely mirror
those of the past (71). But what would a more in-depth, granular analysis reveal?

3c. An Analysis of Rent Policies and Eviction Bans
Table 3: Policies Regarding Rent-Freezes and Eviction Bans (March 2020-March 2022)
Identifier Sponsor
Who Benefits?
Key Points
Bill
682/20 García Larraburu, Silvina (FdT) Renters of residential real estate 1. Outlaws the payment of advance rent for periods greater than one month
2. Outlaws the payment of security deposits of a value greater than one month's rent
3. Allows for early terminatation of a pre-determined lease period
Decree
319/20
Alberto Fernández (FdT)
Mortgagors 1. Freezes the value of monthly installments on mortgage loans as they were in March of 2020
2. Suspends foreclosures throughout the nation until October of 2020
Decree
320/20
Alberto Fernández (FdT)
Tenants unable to pay rent 1. Suspends evictions of properties wherein the eviction was prompted due to late payments
2. Extends the leases of tenants whose contracts were due to expire by 9/30/2020
3. Fixes the prices of rental units to the price of the rental property in March of 2020
Decree
767/20
Alberto Fernández (FdT)
Mortgagors 1. Extends the terms of decree 319/20 through January 31, 2021
2. Freezes mortgage fees to <35% of current income of mortgagor
3. Allows for the refinancing of debt accrued from mortgage and loan payments
Sources: Cámara de Diputados, Cámara de Senados, Boletín Oficial
Type

In analyzing the set of policies above, it becomes clear that the FdT is doing whatever it
takes to maintain a semblance of normalcy within their constituency. First and foremost, this set
of policies tackles the issue of rising rent prices within Argentina, an issue that has almost
unilaterally impacted metropolitan areas such as Buenos Aires. The FdT’s solution to this issue
makes logical sense from a practical perspective; in reality, however, the results have been far
from what they were intended to be.
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But in what ways do these policies reflect the populist influences of the Peronist FdT on
policy formation? The very notion of rent controls – government actions that seek to place limits
on the amount landlords can charge for the sale/lease/rent of a housing unit – appeal to populists,
as they (at face value) appear to provide affordable housing at an affordable, governmentregulated price for all. And in the midst of a devastating pandemic that caused much of the
international market to shut down, it is not hard to see why such policies would look so
attractive. By aiming to create a segment of the Buenos Aires housing market that would be
affordable for their constituency, the FdT effectively sought to consolidate their base of support
into the future. To that end, these policies are meant to benefit the working-, lower-, and middleclass population living in urban areas such as Buenos Aires. By locking in rent prices at thencurrent rates, the rationale was to provide some sense of continuity for those whose lives would
be the most severely impacted, as the “aforementioned emergency… makes it very difficult for a
significant number of tenants to meet their obligations under the terms stipulated in their
contracts, drawn up for a situation very different from the current one” (Fernandez 2020b). To
justify such stringent measures, the administration points to the “non-delegable obligations” of
the State of Argentina to protect its citizens’ “right to housing” (2020b). In doing so, the
Fernández administration gave itself a broad brush of unenumerated powers that it would then
use to curtail the devastating effects of the pandemic by any means necessary.
But the actual consequences of the aforementioned policies have been as numerous as
they have been detrimental. First, because the new laws stipulate that rents cannot be increased
past what they were in March of 2020 (and can only now do so once every 12 months), landlords
have preemptively raised the monthly rent in February, circumventing this potential loss of
revenue and keeping the rates at the artificially inflated rates for the next year. This has resulted
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in tenants of apartments in the greater Buenos Aires area paying 67% more compared to the
previous year, with average apartment prices sitting at around $35,000 ARS (~$377 USD); in
lieu of making apartment prices more affordable, these policies have had the opposite result
(Gillespie 2022a). Second, the surging rent prices have also outpaced both the increase in salaries
and the rate of inflation by substantial margins; between December 2020-January 2021, the
average salary went up by 29.6%, representing less than half of the change in salary (Ministerio
de Economía 2021). Third, due to the new mandates regarding rental contracts, the average
length of leases have gone up in Buenos Aires (on average going from 24 months to 36), locking
in tenants into unaffordable and unreasonable contracts while putting further strain on workingand lower-class city dwellers as a whole. Because of the draconian and confusing set of housing
policies that have taken all of the power out of the hands of the landlords, “many owners [in the
greater Buenos Aires area have] simply stopped renting out, removing supply and leading to
even higher prices” (Gillespie 2022a). This has resulted in a 12% decrease in rental apartment
listings in the city and a 36% decrease in the greater metropolitan area since 2019 (Coniam et al.
2021). In an already convoluted housing market – wherein home sales and rents are denominated
in US dollars despite the fact that the vast majority of the nation earns Argentine Pesos – the
policies surrounding rents and evictions have had disastrous results for many of the Kirchnerist
electorate.
Another unforeseen consequence has been the fact that – despite the myriad of protection
for tenants – the rate of evictions is now higher than ever before; between April and September
of 2021, “nearly 1,500 eviction court cases were registered in the city of Buenos Aires”; to put
that figure into perspective, the city registered merely 3,297 cases throughout the entirety of
2019 (Pellettieri 2021). Though it remains a fact that evictions and rising rents are the inevitable
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detrimental effects of a global pandemic, such policies have exacerbated the degree to which the
bottom line – the Argentine public – has been impacted. In many ways, these policies have been
extremely regressive, hurting lower-income Argentines more so than the wealthier citizens; in
comparison to the state of the overall real estate market, brokers of suburban homes in wealthy
gated communities state that their “market has exploded,” as upper-class residents have fled the
city for the lavish, comfortable privacy of their own homes (Popescu 2021).
It becomes clear that the policies of the FdT surrounding evictions and rent prices have
failed to amount to any sort of positive change; but this should not come as a surprise. Rent
control policies (unquestionably populist in nature) have had an adverse effect on the creation of
affordable housing in Argentina; a study conducted on housing data over the last 100 years in
Latin American nations has demonstrated that rent controls – when strong – “generate various
negative byproducts”, and – when weak – “hardly slow down rent increases” (Jacobo and
Kholodilin 2022, 12). The policies meant to alleviate the burden on the FdT’s voting electorate
has, instead, further decimated their standard of living.

3d. An Analysis of Policies Surrounding Firing Bans
Table 4: Policies Regarding Firing Bans (March 2020-March 2022)
Identifier Sponsor
Who Benefits?
Key Points
Decree
310/20
Alberto Fernández (FdT)
Argentine working class 1. Prohibition of making dismissals for no cause for 90 days after passage
2. Prohibiton of making suspensions for the aforementioned duration
3. In the case of a dismissal, the worker is entitled to compensation equal to double the salary
4. For 90 days, COVID-19 will be treated as an occupational health disease
Decree
329/20
Alberto Fernández (FdT)
Argentine working class 1. Prohibition of making dismissals with no cause for 60 days
2. Firing due to lack of work and force majeure no longer constitutes grounds for dismissal
Decree
891/20
Alberto Fernández (FdT)
Argentine working class 1. Extension of the previous two decrees for a period of 60 days
Sources: Cámara de Diputados, Cámara de Senados, Boletín Oficial
Type

If rent controls and eviction bans reflect the populist nature of Peronism, then firing bans
highlight the party-labor linkages that have existed in some capacity within the party since its
inception in the 1940s. The preamble for Decree 310/20 – which outlawed dismissals for no
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cause or force majeure – declares that “the preferential protection of workers is a guarantee [in]
the National Constitution”; it further stipulates that the Coronavirus serves as an extraordinary
situation that has “put the very fabric of industrial relations at risk”, and that this has forced the
administration to “adopt strong, robust actions” to mitigate damages (Fernández 2022a). In
adopting measures to artificially maintain employment levels by proscribing dismissals, these
policies clearly are meant to benefit the formal employment sector – and perhaps more
importantly – the various labor unions that exist within the country. But not all sectors of formal
labor were impacted equally. In fact, the construction industry saw a 31.6% decrease in revenue
compared to one-year prior, while the energy and water sectors saw a 3.2% increase in revenue
(Ámbito.com 2020). While other segments of industry were affected (especially those reliant on
international markets such as commerce and the financial sector), the mandatory nationwide
quarantine was especially bad for sectors dominated by manual labor (such as manufacturing,
construction, and mining); not surprisingly, these are the same segments from which Peronist
coalitions receive large amounts of support. The Fernández administration – from the beginning
– has sought to reinvigorate and maintain strong relations with trade unions; President Fernández
has even gone so far as to call trade unionists “protagonists” of a new Argentina (Télam 2019).
Despite the rocky relations that have manifested between organized labor and Peronists, Unions
still yield considerable amounts of power and influence; strikes and organized labor movements
have been (and continue to be) used to enact union agendas to great success, even as recently as
December of 2020, when a 20-day strike by oilseed workers was ended due to successful
negotiations of new COVID-cognizant salaries (Demaree-Saddler 2020). This begins to explain
why such friendly relations are critical in achieving electoral success in Argentina. Within this
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context, these policies appear to be aimed at appeasing the institutions of organized labor. But
have these regulations rectified the dire labor issues exacerbated by the pandemic?
The policies surrounding firing bans have had a similar impact, that is to say, they have
had a detrimental effect on the issues they were trying to rectify. Decree 310/20 was passed
through to protect the Argentine worker; however, in maintaining such prohibitive policies for so
long, Argentina has risked bankrupting the very companies it meant to protect. To circumvent
the prohibition of firings for no cause, companies have been forced to resort to temporary
suspensions, “which soared as much as 10 times from pre-pandemic levels” (Gillespie 2020).
While it is true that suspensions – like firings – have been prohibited, firms operate in an obscure
grey area in this regard; in temporarily suspending their personnel, all these companies are doing
is delaying the inevitable, “effectively postponing future job cuts” (2020). What is more, the
overbearing pressures placed on the formal labor market will certainly result in the erosion of
formal employment, as more and more Argentines will turn to the informal sector for sources of
income.
But the informal market, too, has problems of its own. With severe restrictions in place
that have hampered intra- and international travel, there are fewer opportunities available to
make a living. The exodus from the formal to the informal will not result in more people
employed; instead, it will merely result in skewed rates of unemployment (due to the fact that
unregistered laborers are not included as a part of the official labor force). As of August of 2021,
the percentage of Argentines living below the poverty line had risen to 42%, with the [formal]
rate of unemployment hovering around 10.2%; in contrast, the 2019 figures highlight a poverty
rate of 14.4%, a far departure from where it stands now (Misculin 2021; Macrotrends 2022). But
as previously stated, the actual figures are probably much higher, as the unemployment figures
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only take into account the registered workers in the formal labor sector. And now, with the
Fernández administration extending the prohibition of unjustified dismissals until June 30th of
2022, this trend seems set to worsen.
Once again, the populist roots of the Peronist coalition rears its head. At face value, it
seems rational to assume that to curb unemployment, the government ought to restrict the very
thing that causes it; however, all these policies have done is artificially flatten unemployment
without tackling the root of the problem, the Argentine workforce’s dependence on the “highcontact, non-remotable occupations” that were hit the hardest by the COVID pandemic (Basu et
al. 2020). Whereas such sectors of employment only constitute 9% of the workforce in the
United States, Argentina’s rate was at 15%. Moreover, the domestic services sector constituted
6% of total employment (compared to the United States’ 2%), while the industrial and
production sector was at 10% of the total (2020). A deeper understanding of the nature of the
Argentine workforce – with its heavy dependence on high-contact work, as well as informal
labor – reveals just how ineffective and inefficient these firing bans have been and begins to
explain the failure of the Peronist electoral alliance to achieve tangible results. Such forms of
labor are not the ones that can be saved by executive decree; instead, they represent a sector of
employment that has fundamentally been altered by the pandemic. Conditions may never return
to pre-pandemic levels in the sales sector, where the personal interactions with salespeople have
been replaced by the ease and comfort of a computer screen. And the same can be said for the
informal sector, whose losses will never be able to be accurately quantified. In attempting to
appease the labor unions – as well as the various other factions within their electoral coalition –
the FdT has inadvertently exacerbated the economic strain put on a majority of their electoral
base.
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3e. An Analysis of Policies Surrounding Tax Hikes and Tax Exemptions
Table 5: Policies Regarding Tax Hikes and Tax Exemptions (March 2020-March 2022)
Identifier Sponsor
Who Benefits?
Key Points
Bill
961/20 Enriquez, Jorge Ricardo (PRO)
Small business owners 1. Assistance meeting tax contributions for small and medium sized enterprises
Self-employed workers 2. Assistance making matched social security payments on behalf of the firm
3. Certain forms of forgiveness on fines, late payments, etc.
Bill
4534/20
Kirchner, Máximo (FdT) Citizens of Argentina with a net 1. Provides a one-time restructured property tax bracket for the wealthy
worth over $200 million ARS* 2. Citizens worth less than $1.8 million pay nothing extra, while others adhere to the bracket
3. 100% of new earnings go towards medical supplies, subsidies, and education, etc.
Bill
528/20
Blas, Ines Imelda (FdT) Employees unable to work due 1. Provides an exemption to income tax for those forced to self-isolate during COVID
to the COVID-19 pandemic
$200 million ARS is roughly equal to $1.82 million USD
Type

Taxation has often been used as a powerful tool to accomplish economic development
within a state; by gathering the funds necessary to enact change, governments are able to achieve
their goals, both society and otherwise. To that end, the use of one-time tax levies gathered from
wealthy citizens during times of economic duress is not a new concept; in fact, such policies
have been used on an international scale, with nations like Japan passing such policies to aid
them in their reconstruction efforts after WWII (Faiola and Laje 2021). In issuing such “wealth
taxes”, governments are able to finance various projects for the betterment of the nation as a
whole; Máximo Kirchner’s “Aporte solidario y extraordinario para ayudar a morigerar los
efectos de la pandemia” (Solidarity and Extraordinary Contribution to Help Reduce the Effects
of the Pandemic) one-time tax levy is being used to fund a smorgasbord of government projects,
most of which pertain to pandemic relief.
By filling their coffers with a progressive wealth tax, they are able to avoid pillaging the
coalition’s voting electorate more so than they already are. Additionally, the FdT loses very few
votes, as the wealthy had neither voted for nor supported them to begin with; the 2019
presidential campaign finance records demonstrate this fact emphatically. While party financing
laws ‘“[prohibit] contributions from ‘permission holders, concessionaires or service or public
works contractors or suppliers’ of the Nation or the provinces”’, it does not prohibit a person
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who “is the owner or director of [a] company” (Crucianelli and Fitz-Patrick 2019). Thus, the
legal contribution limit is blurred. Conservative incumbent Mauricio Macri received $18 million
for his presidential campaign, with many donors being heads of powerful business
conglomerates. Among those to contribute were Jorge Guillermo Stuart Milne (one of the former
owners of Banco Patagonia), María Luisa Bárbara Miguens (shareholder of Central Puerto, the
second largest electricity generator in the nation), and Eduardo Constantini (a real estate mogul);
it should be noted, however, that the aforementioned donors all contributed around $1.6 million
dollars each, with many more donating seven figures (Fitz-Patrick, Crucianelli). In contrast, the
FdT only had a single donor whose contributions surpassed that mark. The Fernández-Kirchner
ticket also received paltry support from corporations, with only eight donating mere weeks
before the election (2019).
Passing the Argentine Senate with a vote of 42-26, Deputy Máximo Kirchner’s (the son
of Peronist presidents Néstor and Cristina Kirchner) wealth tax bill was signed into law in
December of 2020. Of the total sum brought in, 20% was to go to the purchase of medical
equipment and COVID-related paraphernalia, 20% to subsidize policies protecting small and
medium size businesses, another 20% to the Ministry of Education, 15% to the Fondo de
Integración Socio-Urbana (the Socio-Urban Integration Fund), and the final 25% to “programs
and projects approved by the Ministry of Energy of the Nation, of exploration, development and
production of natural gas” within Argentina (Kirchner 2020). The totality of the bill was
applicable to around 12,000 Argentines (representing around 0.02% of the total population); the
data suggests that of that 12,000, around 10,000 citizens paid the lump sum. Despite this, the
one-time levy managed to bring in a staggering $2.4 billion ARS, representing nearly 0.5% of
the nation’s GDP (Kaplan 2021b).
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But how effective are wealth taxes, one-off or otherwise? Do the successes of Máximo
Kirchner’s bill in bringing in cash represent the continuation of a trend, or is it an exception to
the norm? While it is true that the pandemic has exacerbated the already rampant levels of wealth
inequality across the world, the literature suggests that such policies would not only be difficult
to implement but would also be rather ineffective in the long run. British-born economist and
Nobel Prize laureate Angus Deaton – whose work on economic inequality has been celebrated
across the world – has stated that such “wealth taxes” would not increase the amount of money
brought in, but rather, would incentivize the wealthy to hide more of their wealth (Kaplan
2021a). In short, these “Robin-Hood” policies meant to abate the worsening levels of economic
inequality would do little in this regard; this is especially true in Argentina, where it is believed
that nearly $180 billion is held offshore by various Argentina corporations and citizens
(Moskowitz 2020). Ultimately, while the tax levy was successful in bringing in $2.4 billion USD
to aid the nation in fighting the adverse effects of the pandemic, the problem continue to persist.
The power to tax, however, is a multifaceted one; beyond simply increasing tax rates,
sovereign governments can choose to lower, restructure, or eliminate taxes altogether. Such
policies work to the benefit of all middle- and working-class citizens, a demographic that – by
and large – is dominated by the Peronists. Much like the Fernández administration’s rent and
eviction policies, the legislation surrounding tax hikes and exemptions were meant to assist the
bottom line. Lowering the amount of money owed to the government gives Argentine citizens
additional liquidity, which they can then use to stimulate the languishing economy. Like a foil to
the affluent impacted by the wealth tax, the demographic impacted by this set of policies would
likely strengthen their support towards the coalition. With many losing out on potential future
revenue due to the strict lockdown mandates, the income tax exemption decree served to lessen
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the harsh economic blow that the constituency was facing. Moreover, in aiding small- and
medium-sized businesses with matching retirement contributions, these decrees also spared cashstrapped Argentine business owners from having to pay for benefits for workers during a time
when business was nonexistent.
But is it possible to quantify the impact that such tax cut/exemption policies have had
thus far with regards to the COVID-19 pandemic? While it is true that cutting taxes provides an
immediate supply of liquidity to be used at the individual’s discretion, attempting to track the
flow of capital is a Sisyphean task. The bigger, macro trends do demonstrate that consumer
spending has gone up, however; after steadily decreasing for months, nationwide consumer
spending went from ~$400 billion ARS in January of 2021 to ~$500 billion ARS mere months
later in May (Trading Economics 2022). Whether or not this represents a correlation or causation
is unknown. What is for certain, however, is that the consumer spending patterns are on an
upward trend and are projected to increase into the future.

3f. An Analysis of Policies Surrounding Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT)
Table 6: Policies Regarding Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) Programs (March 2020-March 2022)
Identifier Sponsor
Who Benefits?
Key Points
Bill
505/20 Sacnun, María de los Ángeles (FdT) Taxi drivers and Rental vehicle workers 1. A one-time, $10,000 ARS payment will be disseminated to one member of the household
2. Also includes informal workers who are in the transportation industry
Decree
309/20
Alberto Fernández (FdT)
Pensioners and the elderly 1. For pensioners and the elderly, a one-time, $3,000 ARS subsidy payment
Disabled Argentines 2. For wealthier pensioners, a subsidy payment up to $18,891.49
Families with children 3. One-time payment for those on Universal Child/Pregnancy Allowances
Sources: Cámara de Diputados, Cámara de Senados, Boletín Oficial
Type

Conditional Cash Transfers (CCT) have had a long history in Latin America. Perhaps the
most notable example is the Brazilian Bolsa Familia, a social welfare program aimed at
providing financial welfare to the poorest of Brazilian families. Argentina, too, has had (and
continues to operate) CCT programs to help out the most marginalized in society. The
Asignación Universal por Hijo (AUH) was implemented in November of 2009 (during the first
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Cristina Fernandez administration) as a way to help parents retain monetary security on behalf of
their children; to that end, it has become one of the widest-reaching CCT programs in Latin
America, benefiting over 2 million households in 2016 (Dettano and Sordini 2019, 6). It is clear
that such social welfare policies serve to benefit the most marginalized in society, or in other
words, the voting demographic most likely to vote for FdT. If firing bans are meant to benefit the
formal labor sector, then these policies work to benefit the informal sector, which has grown in
importance over the past few decades.
As previously stated, the informal labor sector constitutes over 40% of the total number
of laborers in the country. And due to the transient nature of informal labor itself (as well as its
complete dependence on the human-to-human interaction that was destroyed by the pandemic
and the ensuing lockdown mandates), the totality of this segment of labor soon found themselves
out of work. In this regard, the pandemic disproportionately affected informal laborers; this
segment of labor – which for many was the only avenue towards financial survival – fell victim
to its own lack of structure. Because these workers are neither taxed for their wages nor
registered to work to begin with, they do not qualify for welfare assistance like their peers in the
formal labor sector. To make matters worse, there are no pension/retirement benefits, no health
care benefits, and – generally speaking – few social benefits to speak of in any regard. But the
fact remains that the most marginalized sector of employment also constitutes one of the most
important electoral sectors within the Peronist constituency. Going beyond the aforementioned
CTEP, other organizations of informal labor have come into prominence; examples include the
Movimiento de Trabajadores Excluidos (Movement of Excluded Workers, MTE). The leaders of
such social organizations have grown in power and influence over the last few elections cycles,
with many leaders now commanding the attention of the FdT as a whole. Juan Grabois, an
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Argentine lawyer and leader of the MTE, has even publicly castigated the Fernández
administration for their continued talks with the IMF, tersely stating that the FdT ought not
“count on [the MTE]” in light of their continued negotiations (Ámbito.com 2022). This
highlights the gravity that such informal labor organizations have attracted in recent years, with
some political pundits calling the Fernández administration’s cordial relations with social leaders
like Grabois a “top priority” for the administration (Fontevecchia 2020).
To that end, Senator Sacnun’s bill, number Bill 505/20, calls the extension of the
Emergency Family Income program (Ingreso Familiar de Emergencia, IFE) to citizens working
in the transportation sector, including freelance and uber drivers. This one time, $10,000 ARS
payment would be disseminated to one member of the household; for families with children, this
would be in addition to the monthly payments they received from the AUH program, which
amounts to around $1,816 ARS per child (Dettano and Sordini 2019, 6). To date, there have been
three separate issuances of payments stemming from the IFE program, with each disbursement
reaching around 9 million Argentines across the territory in a country of 44 million people (Peter
2020). The total governmental investment amounted to around $265 million ARS; and while a
fourth payment in the near future is unlikely, these lump sum cash handouts have been successful
in alleviating the deteriorating conditions of the working class. What’s more, 55.7% of the IFE
payments were disbursed to women, a recognition of the gender inequality found in many sectors
of the Argentine economy; not only did this program aim to remedy the gender gap – which
results in women earning 27% less than men in the formal sector and a staggering 38% less in
the informal sector – but it also actively sought to prioritize them within households (2020). For
instance, if there were multiple applicants within a single household, the priority was to be given
to the women.
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But what this program has done is merely expose the inherent social inequalities that
exist within Argentine society; what it has not yet done is rectify the root causes. It is true that
cash handouts such as the IFE and AUH provide short-term relief for the destitute and prevent
them from falling deeper and deeper into poverty. However, the national programs’ long-term
effects are unclear. Cursory research has been conducted on the AUH program in Argentina,
with the literature suggesting an inverse correlation between AUH payments and school dropout
rates for children aged 12-17 (students whose families receive AUH payments drop out of school
at a lower rate compared to those whose families did not). But because of the recent
implementation of the vast majority of CCT programs in Latin America, there is limited
scholarship on the long-term economic impacts of such programs; whereas some studies indicate
“reduced adult labor market participation” for recipients of CCT, others point to an increase in
investments as a result of the increase in liquidity (Coomes 2022). Whether or not these policies
will improve the financial health of the middle- and lower-class Argentines is still unknown.
What is known is that for many Argentines, these cash handouts was all that stood between them
and a life of destitution. The Peronist policies surrounding Conditional Cash Transfer Programs
reflect popular sentiments that have existed in Latin America since the Pink Tide: a rejection of
the neoliberal policies of the past, an emphasis on social and collective welfare, and the
promotion of economic equality amongst its constituency.
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3g. An Analysis of Policies Surrounding Business Ancillary Programs
Table 7: Policies Regarding Business Ancillary Programs (March 2020-March 2022)
Identifier Sponsor
Who Benefits?
Key Points
Bill
487/20
García Larraburu, Silvina (FdT) Workers in critically affected industries 1. Monetary assistance with home maintenance
Minimum wage workers 2. Temporary exemption from employer contributions in critically affected industries*
Informal laborers 3. Setting maximum prices on certain food, medical, and hygeine products
Decree
332/20
Alberto Fernández (FdT) Small-business owners and employees 1. Full payment of salaries for workers in private sector WITH relations to public sector
Minimum wage workers 2. Reduction of up to 95% of employer contributions to social security
3. These payments will vary depending on the size of the company
Decree
376/20
Alberto Fernández (FdT) Small-business owners and employees 1. Extension of the policies within Decree 332/20
Minimum wage workers 2. Zero-rate credit for borrowers who work/own small businesses
3.Restructured unemployment benefits (minimum $6,000 ARS, maximum $10,000 ARS)
Program
ATP**
Alberto Fernández (FdT)

Type

Sources: Cámara de Diputados, Cámara de Senados, Boletín Oficial
*Such industries include: leisure companies, cinemas, theaters, restaurants, hotels, etc.
**Programa de Asistencia de emergencia al Trabajo y la Producción (Emergency Work and Production Assistence Program)

This set of policies were created with the expressed intent of providing support to smalland medium-sized businesses during the pandemic; to that end, this grouping contains a variety
of policies pertaining to everything from matching retirement contributions to price fixing
measures. By the end of June of 2020, “28,000 Argentine small businesses [had already] gone
under”; such policies were aimed at preventing further destruction of the small business sector
(Lammertyn and Raszewski 2020). Decree 376/20 states that “the impact on productive activity
has been deepening as a consequence of the successive extensions of the social, preventive and
compulsory isolation measures and that this reality immediately and acutely affects companies as
well as different segments of workers and dependent and independent workers” (Fernández
2020c). Argentine owners of such businesses found themselves in a terrible financial
predicament. Even with no work to be had, they were prohibited from firing their employees, lest
they pay a fine worth double the salary of the fired workers. But where was the money to come
from? With revenues drastically reduced across the country, government action was essential in
keeping such businesses afloat.
To counteract the volatility of the markets, the Fernández administration – in addition to
other sets of policies – chose to exercise price controls on items they deemed essential. Such
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items include certain food products, personal hygiene products, medicine, and medical supplies.
And in critically affected industries such as airfare and travel, accommodations were made to
exempt firms from having to make matching retirement contributions, with the government
taking the brunt of that economic burden themselves. This would be a consistent theme
throughout the rest of the policies in this section, as clauses regarding social security and
retirement pensions appear in all the included legislation. In an effort to resuscitate their
middling COVID economy, the central bank also allowed for small- and medium-size business
owners to borrow lines of credit with no interest, meaning the lender was making no money on
such transactions, essentially giving money away for free. In providing such ancillary financial
support for small-owned enterprises, firms would then be able to focus their efforts on other
things without having to worry about retaining their employees.
But as stated previously, Argentina’s economic woes – although exacerbated by the
Coronavirus pandemic – are deeply rooted in the nature of Argentine society itself. To that end,
the policies surrounding salary programs have had negligible positive effects, while putting the
nation deeper into debt and increasing the annual governmental deficit. Zero-interest borrowing
– one of the main tenets of Decrees 332/20 and 376/20 – allows for select small business owners
to borrow lines of credit from banks with no interest. It can reasonably be assumed that the
interest rates were lowered in an effort to stimulate borrowing and spending in the languishing
COVID Argentine economy; however, it appears as though “private lending hasn’t increased
despite incentives provided to banks” as well as people (Doll and Gillespie 2021). And while
zero-interest borrowing might be conducive to stimulating spending and borrowing, it is not
conducive to lowering inflation; in a nation where inflation rates are at 50% and climbing, the
central bank ought to raise interest rates to appreciate the value of their currency, which now sits
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at an all-time low (2021). In addition to low levels of borrowing and low to zero interest rates,
the government has committed to printing over $900 billion ARS in the second half of 2021,
which represents a figure nearly double the amount printed in the first half. Despite receiving
support from Argentina’s small businesses for its contributory efforts, the nation’s cacophony of
nonsensical salary assistance policies have crippled its recovery efforts, both in the short- and
long-term. To aggravate the already worsening situation, the Peronist coalition now finds itself at
a crossroads between its voting constituency and the International Monetary Fund (IMF). On one
hand, the national government needs to find a way to continue to pay back – or refinance – the
$44 billion loan it owes to the supranational financial entity (a residual debt left over from the
bailout during the Macri presidency). On the other hand, the FdT must find a way to appease the
Argentine public, as thousands have hit the streets in a show of protest denouncing the
cooperation with the IMF.

3h. Conclusion
One of the biggest concluding trends is the fact that all of the policies passed into law
originated from the Frente de Todos, the electoral coalition of Kirchnerist president Alberto
Fernández. While seemingly trivial nature, it highlights the fact that the Kirchnerist coalition is
predicated upon the popular support it receives from working-class and lower-class Argentines,
most of whom continue to be adversely impacted by the pandemic to this day. The policies
surrounding rent controls, CCTs, and eviction bans are a testament to this fact. Moreover, the de
facto populist FdT also owes its allegiances to the labor unions that exist within the Argentine
industries; the various decrees and laws passed surrounding firing bans and salary programs are a
causal effect of this historic relationship. Peronist ties to labor – both organized and informal –
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have necessitated the passage of the wide breadth of economic policies, as the effective
leadership of the FdT becomes moot with the loss of the support from the masses. This causal
relationship – that between labor and the types of policies passed – is one of many indicators
highlighting the impact Peronism’s coalition of support has had on the on the formation and
passage of COVID-related economic policies in the nation thus far.
There are a myriad of ways a nation can improve its economic standing, even in the face
of catastrophe. A nation can limit its spending, both domestic and international. A nation can
decrease its tax burden. A nation can adapt to the changing conditions of the new economic
norms. But what Argentina – and the Peronist FdT coalition – has done obfuscates their
purported commitment to improving the lives of the Argentine public. Only within the contexts
of Peronism and Kirchnerism do the actions of the FdT start to make sense. First, in adhering to
its roots and close ties to laborism and unions, the FdT made a commitment to artificially retain
jobs and wages. This resulted in an exponential rise in the number of “suspensions,” which
merely serve as proxies to firing and only delays the inevitable. Second, in implementing
populist policies to increase taxes for the rich, the nation merely incentivizes the wealthy to hide
more of the wealth, while doing nothing to help the nation’s bottom line. Third, in choosing to
continue their quantitative easing measures – as well as the implementation of zero-interest
lending – Argentina is faced with the threat of yet another fiscal crisis, its third since the turn of
the century.
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Chapter 4: Comparative Policy Analysis between Argentina (FdT) and Chile
(Chile Vamos)

4a. Introduction
The past few decades have indeed been fortuitous for the Latin American nation of Chile.
Despite suffering from similar bouts of authoritarianism and military dictatorship during the
waning decades of the 20th century, research demonstrates that “per capita income has more than
doubled over the past 20 years and is now the highest in Latin America”; this is due in no small
part to their “strong macroeconomic framework… prudent fiscal policy supported by a fiscal rule
and a well-working inflation-targeting framework with an independent central bank” (OECD
2021). But Chile – much like the rest of the world – suffered heavily as a result of the
Coronavirus pandemic; to that end, what does a comparative policy analysis reveal about the
nature of politics in the country?
Chile during the initial onset of the Coronavirus was ruled by a conservative government;
at the helm was billionaire businessman and leader of the center-right Chile Vamos (Let’s Go
Chile), Sebastián Piñera, in contrast to the left/center-left FdT. While no longer in a position of
power (with its leader Sebastián Piñera having been replaced by leftist Gabriel Boric in the 2021
presidential elections), Chile Vamos was charged with the seemingly Sisyphean task of
mitigating the devastating impact of the Coronavirus pandemic. As a center-right alliance, they
promoted a “centrist message of economic growth, coupled with more handouts for the needy”
(The Economist 2017). Unfortunately, the Piñera administration severely underestimated the
economic impact that the pandemic would have. But not only did the pandemic cause a deluge of
social, economic, and political shocks, its arrival coincided with the “appearance of social
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conflict”, a euphemistic way of describing the burgeoning second pink-tide movement in as
many decades (AS/COA 2021). Sharing many qualities with the 31 st president of the United
States Herbert Hoover, the successful businessman and billionaire Sebastián Piñera saw his
presidential aspirations destroyed by the economic crisis, as his approval ratings reached an
abysmal 9% by the end of his tenure (Diario UChile 2021). Despite the fact that he was ineligible
to run for reelection (as Chile prohibits presidents from serving two consecutive terms), such
results did little to mobilize support for the conversative parties, as their reputation had been
indelibly stained in perpetuity.

His low approval ratings were not unwarranted, however; by the end of 2020, Chile was
suffering from one of the worst outbreaks of COVID-19 in the world, ultimately leading to the
resignation of Health Minister Jaime Mañalich (Saavedra 2020). And much like his fellow
conservative presidential contemporary Mauricio Macri, Piñera’s presidency ended with the
return of the left. Beyond just the health impacts, the nation’s economy also contracted
tremendously, by 6% in 2020 and not expected to fully recover until 2022 (Europa News 2021).
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It remains a fact that the nation’s initial COVID trajectory resembled Argentina’s; but in what
ways have the two nations approached the issue of economic recovery differently?

4b. COVID Policy Similarities
Table 9: Economic Responses to COVID in Argentina and Chile
COVID
Response

Argentina

Chile

• 10% contraction in 2020
• 6% contraction in 2020
Economic
• Projected 8.3% growth in 2021
• Between 5.57-6.25% contraction in 2021
Outlook
(March 2022) • Represents a much more positive outlook • 22% drop in profit according to Chilean
than last year’s estimate
Central Bank figures
• Freeze rents at 03/2020 rates
Rent / Eviction • Lengthen average lease from 24 to 36
months
Policies
N/A
• Lower cost of mortgages and easier
refinancing of debt
• Reduction of on-site personnel at certain
Employment
• Prohibited dismissal and suspensions
state-owned enterprises
Policies
without cause or force majeure
• Passage of new labor laws that allow for
• Firing results in compensation up to 2x
more remote work
original pay
• Tax exemptions for those forced to self- • Passage of bill allowing for early
Tax and
isolate due to COVID
withdrawal from pension funds with no
Individual
fines
Ancillary
• One-time wealth tax levy for the ultraPolicies
wealthy
• Can withdraw up to 10% twice to increase
liquid assets
• $626 USD bonus as part of the Middle• One-time $10,000 ARS payments to
Class Plan
households (~$89 USD)
Conditional
• Emergency Family Income Project (a
Cash Transfer • Assistance for households with small
CCT program consisting of ~$142 USD
children
monthly payments to families)
• $150 million USD to be disseminated to
• Matching retirement contribution
180,000 small- and medium-sized Chilean
exemptions for small- and medium-sized
enterprises via zero-rate loans
businesses
Business
• Fixed, $24 billion USD fund to be
• Zero-rate credit for small and mediumAncillary
borrowed at zero-rate credit for
sized businessowners
Policies
businessowners
• Price fixing of several essential goods,
• $3 billion guarantee fund for small
such as medical supplies and personal
businesses
hygiene products
• Price fixing of COVID tests at max of
$30
Sources: AS/COA 2022; Cámara de Senados; Cámara de Diputados

In some ways, the Chilean response to the Coronavirus pandemic mirrored that of
Argentina’s. One of the most prominent examples of this has to do with the social welfare and
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cash transfer programs that the two nations implemented to remediate the dire financial burden
placed upon the nations’ middle- and working- classes. Similar to the CCT programs dedicated
to disseminating funds to the nation’s essential workers (starting with medical personnel and
eventually including taxi drivers, as well as others in the transportation industry), Chile’s
programs had similar aims, with the ~$650 USD monthly bonuses being reserved for those who
had seen a salary reduction of 30% or over during the pandemic. The aptly titled “Middle Class
Plan” was passed through Congress in late July of 2020; in a speech given in August of the same
year, President Piñera touted the purported success of his new social initiative, stating that over
one million people had thus far received the $626 monthly payment (Cambero and Laing 2020).
Yet another commonality between the two nation’s responses was their respective
approaches to providing relief to small- and medium-sized enterprises. In late April of 2020,
Piñera announced his plan to free up around $24 billion for the purposes of creating a fund from
which businesses large and small could take out zero-interest loans; this piece of legislation
would be applicable to “99.8% of the country’s companies, which provide 84% of employment”
(Prensa Presidencia 2020). In addition to this newly created fund, the administration worked
alongside BancoEstado (one of the largest banks in Chile, as well as its only public bank) to
establish a $3 billion guaranteed fund exclusively for small businesses; moreover, the
government temporarily suspended “stamp taxes”, which are levies imposed on documents “that
show money lending operations” (AS/COA 2021). These measures were passed for the benefit of
the middle class. And by offering financial breaks for the fledging small-business sector, the
respective presidential administrations highlighted their firm commitment to their respective
voting constituencies, all the while ensuring that some of these firms will survive into the post-
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pandemic economy. Despite these similarities, however, it is the differences that truly set the two
nations apart.

4c. COVID Policy Disparities
Even a perfunctory glance at the two sets of legislation reveals many differences between
the policies of Chile and Argentina; one of the most obvious is the fact that Chile – unlike
Argentina’s myriad of executive decrees – chose to pass their policies through Congress, not the
executive branch. Another of the biggest differences between Chile and Argentina has been the
presence – or lack thereof – of protectionist rent and eviction policies. In contrast to Argentina’s
firing ban, many enterprises were forced to contend with job cuts to avoid bankruptcy; even the
nationalized copper producer “Codelco, announced it would be reenacting precautionary
measures… including a reduction in on-site personnel.” In addition, the national government
announced $69 million USD in cuts in nine regions’ budgets. Such austere measures were rarely
found in neighboring Argentina, where annual government deficits – including a $5.6 billion
ARS addition meant for “flexibility” in dealing with the COVID crisis – ran high for the majority
of the pandemic (AS/COA 2021). But rampant spending isn’t the only reason for the high levels
of inflation and the generally dire economic conditions that plague Argentina today; 2021 saw
the Argentine central bank print money at some of the highest rates ever seen, with over $510
billion ARS being printed in the first half of the year alone (Gillespie 2021b). This sharp contrast
highlights the differences in the coalitional dynamics of each respective country. Due to the
ideologically disjointed nature of the FdT – as well as their smorgasbord of strange political
bedfellows – Argentina’s policies reflect the strong relationship shared between the Peronist
parties and the Peronist traditions. While the Chile Vamos saw no need to legislate such
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draconian rent control and eviction polices, the FdT’s dependence on the working class
necessitated these stringent measures, as it was essential to sate the population that had been hit
the hardest: their own voters. In many ways, Peronist coalitions are handicapped by their own
diversity; it is a party that has oftentimes stretched itself too thin.
Whereas Argentina resorted to quantitative easing (that is, the purchasing of long-term
securities by a central bank that increases the money supply and spurns additional spending and
investment) to alleviate the financial strain put on by the pandemic, Chile attempted to achieve
the same result in a completely opposite manner. Instead of ramping up spending across the
totality of all of the regions, the Chilean government adopted austerity measures that would
reduce spending, even calling for a “reassignment of money from areas with slower spending
rates to others” (AS/COA 2021). In being cognizant of a ballooning budget deficit that would
result from rampant and inefficient COVID spending, the Piñera administration sought to reverse
the course of the COVID-induced recession – not through “printing money” – but rather, by
creating and implementing policies that would create salient, permanent change in the country
(Fontevecchia 2020). To that end, the vast majority of their policies mirror this goal.
Another difference between the two nations comes in the form of price controls, a set of
policies aimed at forcibly setting the cost of certain products at an affordable level in perpetuity.
In Piñera’s Chile, the only policy that could possibly be considered as such would be a
government mandate that set the maximum cost of COVID tests from private healthcare facilities
at $30 USD (AS/COA 2021). In contrast, Argentina has not only established price controls on
mobile, internet, and television subscriptions, it has done so for the most essential products and
services. With the pre-midterm talks breaking down between the Fernández administration and
the COPAL (Argentina’s main food industry chamber), the government was forced to once again
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implement price controls “over a thousand household goods until early 2022” so as to artificially
curb the rate of inflation (Bianchi 2021). The biggest problem isn’t the use of price controls
themselves; in fact, price controls can often be used as positive tools during times of war or in
otherwise distorted markets. The larger problem lies in its use as a tool to fight inflation, as it
then becomes transmogrified into a weapon of populist design. Not only do price controls
artificially alter the demand for products, it gradually changes the supply as well. The
aforementioned rent controls are a testament to this fact. The rent control laws had left landlords
with one of two choices: either stay locked at current rates for three years (thereby losing out on
huge amounts of future revenue), or preemptively raise rents to avoid that pitfall. To no one’s
surprise, rents in the greater Buenos Aires metropolitan area ballooned within a matter of
months. Demand fell because the skyrocketing prices became unaffordable to all but the
wealthiest of Argentines while supply fell due to the lack of demand (as well as the fact that
landlords were incensed with the nationalization of rent pricing).
The third – and arguably most glaring – difference lies in the respective nations’ policy
responses to employment. In contrast to Argentina’s hardline policy on the prohibition of
dismissals without just cause or force majeure, Chile adopted a set of policies aimed at
maximizing efficacy while minimizing COVID exposure. Part of the legislative package
included measures for government-sponsored firms choosing to reduce on-site working
personnel. Mere months into the Coronavirus pandemic, the Chilean legislative body voted to
amend the nation’s labor laws; the new amendments stipulate and allow “companies to suspend
employment contracts or negotiate reduced work schedules with their employees.” In addition,
the new laws also allowed for entire companies to be suspended in cases wherein government
mandated lockdowns and curfews would “make it impossible for a company to conduct its
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activities” (Fenner et al. 2020). While these workers would be compensated for the loss in
income by the federal government, said benefits did not amount to much more than the
previously existing unemployment benefits.

4d. Conclusion
The stark disparities in national policies highlight the main fundamental difference
between Peronist Argentina and conservative Chile: the Peronist tradition of the electoral
coalition. It becomes clear from the beginning that Argentina’s rent and eviction policies are
populist in nature. While it is true that other not-populist nations have implemented similar types
of policies (with a glaring example being that of the United States), the Peronist coalition’s
historic roots as the de facto populist coalition help to contextualize these policies. Such policies
are a critical cog within the Peronist electoral mechanism. Without the local substrata of support
(in the form of local town, city, and provincial Peronist parties), it becomes exponentially more
difficult to galvanize national support, as the structure of the coalition is predicated upon the
success at the local level. By protecting the interests of the individual over the long-term interests
of the nation vis-à-vis protectionist housing policies, Argentina’s FdT emphatically demonstrates
its commitment to upholding the populist traditions of the past. In contrast, Chile’s reinforced
“Winter Plan” will fund and operate “80 new [homeless] shelters” across the entire country,
while at the same time providing the nation’s homeless population of ~15,000 with an increase
“in transportation routes”, street care, medical supplies, and even COVID testing and vaccinating
(Piñera 2020). But the Peronist traditions manifest themselves through the employment policies,
as well. Contrary to Argentina’s bans on dismissals and suspensions, Chile actively passed
legislation that would seek to cut costs and improve firm-wide efficacy in whatever way
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possible. This usually came in the form of widespread layoffs, especially in industries that were
unable to function during lockdowns and quarantines. Instead of protecting the interests of the
individual, Chile attempted to ensure the survival of its economy as a whole. Chile made no
discernible effort to retain what was already lost; in Argentina, however, the generalized ban on
employee dismissals has been extended multiple times, with the latest extension ending on
December 31st, 2021, over one and half years after its initial introduction (Azzopardi 2020). Such
analyses make clear the fundamental difference in terms of the respective coalitions of support;
while businesses are a core constituency of the Chile Vamos, unions and labor are what make up
the core of the Peronist coalitions.
It appears as though Argentina’s policies seek to protect the status quo, even in the midst
of a cataclysmic pandemic that will indubitably change the very fabric of society itself; instead
of accepting the changing circumstances, the FdT has sought to artificially maintain the same
level of rent, employment, and even prices to maintain what is no longer there.
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Chapter 5: Conclusion
“Everything must change for everything to remain the same.” In many aspects, this quote
by famed Italian author Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa seems to perfectly encapsulate the very
essence of Peronism in Argentina. Despite going through dramatic changes since its inception in
1946, the crux of Peronism – the retention of power by all means necessary – has endured; in the
end, Peronism is an anti-reformist ideology wherein power and influence are predicated by
popular support (Sturzenegger 2021). The purpose of this thesis is to elucidate the impact of
Peronist traditions on economic policy formulation during the COVID-19 crisis. To that end,
research concludes that Peronist traditions have manifested themselves in a few different ways.
First, Peronism’s history of garnering popular support from the masses remains a central
tenet to this day. Rent control and eviction ban policies have widely been – and continue to be –
propagated, with the various executive decrees being extended into 2022. Catastrophic price
shocks notwithstanding, these policies also strongly denote populist influences; they are also in
stark contrast to the types of policies passed in neighboring Chile. This is significant in that Chile
– much like Argentina – has had a history of populism and dictatorial regimes in its own right.
However, what stands out is the fact that despite the shared historical commonalities, the range
of housing-related policies could not have been more different. Whereas the FdT forcibly locked
in rents at pre-pandemic rates (thereby not taking into consideration the fiscal impact of the
pandemic on both landlords and tenants), Chile opted to provide support to the masses in
different ways. Instead of attempting to rectify the current existing problem – that of the COVIDinduced housing crisis – Chile chose to focus on the larger economic impact of Chile as a whole;
to that end, many of their policies centered around increasing liquidity, thereby giving Chilean
citizens more opportunities to spend, ultimately spurring the stagnant economy. Another
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example of Peronism’s populist influences on current economic policy is that of the “wealth” tax
levied upon the wealthiest Argentines. Despite the history of wealth taxes failing to surmount to
tangible long-term change, Máximo Kirchner’s wealth tax bill managed to bring in over $2
billion USD into the Argentine coffers. However, wealth taxes are inherently populist, as taxing
a minority for the benefit of the majority inculcates sentiments vetting the minority against “the
people.”
Second, Peronism’s ties to organized domestic labor can be seen clearly through an
analysis of policy. Specifically, the Fernández administration’s passage of various iterations of
firing bans is indicative of such. In a contracting economy, maintaining the same level of
employment becomes an exercise in futility; and with demand decreasing as a result of
lockdowns and travel bans, there is no need to artificially inflate employment figures. Not only
did such policies put tremendous strain on the businesses now forced to pay the salaries of
workers with no work to be done, but they also merely delayed the inevitable. Soon enough,
businesses were replacing their firing practices – which were now prohibited – with policies of
“temporary suspensions.” Conversely, the Chilean government’s approach to the employment
crisis can best be described as pragmatic; instead of forcing firms to keep workers doing no work
on payroll, the government chose to enact legislation revising the nation’s labor laws to allow for
greater access to remote and online work. Moreover, the government actively sought solutions to
minimize the number of on-site personnel, even for their state-owned enterprises. Such
disparities highlight the linkages between party and organized labor. Firing bans also doubly
favor Peronists in that they also retain jobs on behalf of their working-class constituency.
I propose that salient linkages between Peronist traditions and policy formulation not
only exist, but rather, act as one of the greatest forces in the legislative landscape of Argentina.
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Through my research, I have expanded upon previously existing literature surrounding the nature
of the relationship between Peronists and public policy by contextualizing these linkages within
the COVID-19 pandemic. This crisis – while politically, economically, and socially devastating
for the entirety of the world – has helped to elucidate in the clearest possible ways the
aforementioned relationship. While a comparative analysis of Argentina and Chile does highlight
the fundamental differences between the two wealthy Latin American contemporaries, it also
begs the question: why is Peronism endemic only to Argentina? Why – despite multitudes of
commonalities going back centuries – are these two nations so vastly different in today’s
society? Such are questions that future research will hopefully reveal.
But the scope of this thesis has not covered the totality of the complexities of Peronism.
Largely absent from my research is an analysis into the other kinds of policies passed during this
time, especially the social policies. Because of the quasi-populist nature of Peronism, social
action is imperative in attaining popular support. And while the economic impact of COVID has
been less than magnanimous, it is no secret that individuals – in light of lockdowns, quarantines,
and travel bans – are the ones that have been hit the hardest. To that end, this also acts as one of
the biggest exigent external circumstance that might have influenced the findings of this thesis.
Peronism’s success is predicated upon one thing: power. While the pursuit of power
might be a central tenet of every political party, Peronism is unique in that it knows no
ideological boundaries, no political creed to which it has consistently adhered since its inception;
it is fluid, a consistently evolving political entity. For nearly eight decades, Peronism has
continued to influence, both directly and indirectly, the course of policy in the nation of
Argentina. A lust for power does not automatically make one a Peronist, nor does it mean all
Peronists share this goal. What it does mean is that for stalwart Peronists, the COVID-19 crisis is
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nothing more than an opportunity to further consolidate their power and influence in Argentina.
One should never let a serious crisis go to waste.
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